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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three essays that analyze the reaction of financial institu-
tions to monetary policy. In the first essay, I use a Bayesian VAR to show that
an increase in the monetary policy rate raises credit intermediation by non-bank
financial institutions (NBFI). As is well known, credit intermediation by banks is
reduced. The movement in opposite directions is explained by the difference in
funding. This finding suggests that the existence of NBFI may decrease aggregate
volatility following monetary policy shocks.
Following this evidence, I construct a theoretical model that includes different
types of funding in the second essay. Households face a savings choice between
state contingent (equity) and non-state contingent (debt) assets. I use the finan-
cial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) as a basis and
microfound the decision by which new net worth in entrepreneurs is created. A
Bayesian estimation suggests a change in the survival rate of entrepreneurs, affect-
ing impulse responses. The analysis suggests that models that use the financial
accelerator should include endogenous firm entry if variables regarding household
portfolios or shocks directly affecting firm net worth are considered.
In the third essay, I develop an estimated monetary DSGE model with funding
market frictions that is able to replicate the empirical facts. In a counterfactual
exercise I study how the regulation of shadow banks affects an economy at the ZLB.
Consumption volatility is reduced when shadow bank assets are directly held by
commercial banks. Alternatively, regulating shadow banks like investment funds
results in a milder recession during, and a quicker escape from, the ZLB. The
reason is that a recessionary demand shock that moves the economy to the ZLB
has similar effects to a monetary tightening due to the inability to reduce the
policy rate below zero.
Keywords: Shadow banking, monetary policy, credit supply, Bayesian VAR,
Bayesian estimation, zero lower bound, search frictions.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Diese Doktorarbeit besteht aus drei Aufsa¨tzen, in welchen die Reaktion von Fi-
nanzinstitutionen auf Geldpolitik analysiert wird. In dem ersten Aufsatz finde ich
anhand eines Bayesian VAR, dass eine Erho¨hung des Leitzinses zu einer zusa¨tzlichen
Kreditvergabe in Nichtbanken (NBFI) fu¨hrt. Banken verleihen wie bereits bekannt
weniger. Der Grund fu¨r die gegensa¨tzliche Bewegung liegt in der unterschiedliche
Art der Finanzierung. Dieser Befund legt nahe, dass die Existenz von NBFI die
Volatilita¨t der aggregierten Kreditvergabe zu geldpolitischen Schocks verringern
ko¨nnte. Zusa¨tzlich bietet die Analyse einen Erkla¨rungsansatz fu¨r die Beobachtung,
dass sich die Kreditvergabe seit der Finanzkrise stockend entwickelt hat.
Im zweiten Aufsatz knu¨pfe ich an diese empirische Untersuchung an, indem ich
ein theoretisches Modell mit unterschiedlichen Arten von Firmenfinanzierung en-
twerfe. Haushalte mu¨ssen sich zwischen festverzinsichlichen und erfolgsbedingten
Sparmo¨glichkeiten entscheiden. Auf Grundlage des Modells von Bernanke, Gertler
und Gilchrist (1999) mikrofundiere ich die Entscheidung u¨ber Unternehmensgru¨ndung
in Form von Eigenkapitalinvestitionen.
Im dritten Aufsatz entwickele ich ein gescha¨tztes DSGE Modell mit Finanzierungs-
friktionen, welches in der Lage ist, die empirischen Ergebnisse zu replizieren. Ich
untersuche, wie sich die Regulierung von Schattenbanken auf eine Volkswirtschaft
am ZLB auswirkt. Konsumvolatilita¨t wird reduziert, wenn Schattenbankenkredite
stattdessen von Banken vergeben werden. Alternativ dazu fu¨hrt die Behandlung
von Schattenbanken wie Investment Fonds dazu, dass eine Volkswirtschaft am
ZLB eine mildere Rezession und einen schnelleren Austritt erlebt. Der Grund
liegt darin, dass ein Nachfrageschock, der die Volkswirtschaft zum ZLB bringt,
eine Reaktion hervorruft, die vergleichbar mit geldpolitischen Schocks ist, da am
ZLB keine Mo¨glichkeit der Leitzinsverringerung besteht.
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chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Monetary policy affects the economy via different channels (Boivin et al., 2010).
The credit channel concerns the ability of a central bank to influence the real
economy via credit intermediation (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) and has been ex-
tensively studied in the past several decades (Peek and Rosengren, 2013). Among
many other findings in that literature, the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy
are notable: credit intermediation is affected differently for creditors of different
sizes (Kashyap and Stein, 1995), legal structures (Campello et al., 2002; Gam-
bacorta, 2005), funding sources (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Cetorelli and Gold-
berg, 2012), etc.; just as debtors react differently depending on size (Gertler
and Gilchrist, 1994), industries (Dedola and Lippi, 2005), liability compositions
(Kashyap et al., 1993), etc. Since credit is now intermediated to a large extend by
shadow banks, there is reason to believe that such credit may react to monetary
policy in ways that are different from bank credit.
The term shadow banking was coined by McCulley (2007) to loosely refer to
credit intermediation by non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) – a part of the
financial economy that had been funding both the real economy (especially hous-
ing) and other financial institutions. This vague definition is best characterized
by the exclusion of entities that have explicit access to a lender of last resort and
that fund themselves via deposits, i.e., commercial banks. NBFI are differently
regulated from commercial banks and may therefore be underregulated by super-
visory institutions and also escape being included within the credit economy. In
fact, according to some estimates the shadow banking system in the United States
grew to exceed the commercial banking system prior to the financial crisis (see
e.g., Pozsar, 2013).
There is no single agreed upon definition for what constitutes shadow bank-
ing. Depending on the application, shadow banking may be defined as the sum
of all entities that engage in credit intermediation without being regulated like
commercial banks (Pozsar et al., 2010), the value of activities that are exposed
to certain risks not covered by traditional regulation (Financial Stability Board,
2015), institutions that rely on a public or private backstop (Adrian and Ashcraft,
2012; Claessens and Ratnovski, 2014), credit that is prone to runs (Gallin, 2013),
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or any number of such alternative characteristics.
The reaction of credit intermediation by NBFI to monetary policy is the focus
of my empirical analysis in the next chapter. Since institutional characteristics
matter, I include commercial banks and split NBFI into two different groups based
on their liability characteristics and relationship to the rest of the economy. The
first group, shadow banks, includes highly leveraged institutions that mostly de-
pend on funding from other financial institutions. The second group, investment
funds, consists of institutions that are directly accessible to households and that
receive funding in the form of equity investments instead of debt. I find that all
these groups’ credit intermediations differ in their reaction to monetary policy:
While banks decrease lending following an increase in the policy rate set by the
central banks, both shadow banks and investment funds increase lending. The
reaction of NBFI stands in contrast to the traditional understanding of the credit
channel and is mostly due to different kinds of funding into these institutions by
their creditors.
The ability of financial institutions to provide credit is in part governed by
the bank lending channel, which posits that a higher policy rate results in less
reservable deposits available to deposit-taking institutions. This is due to the
open market operations of the central bank, which, in the process of increasing the
policy rate, eliminates reserves that are necessary to satisfy reserve requirements.
Banks can offer non-deposit liabilities or raise equity, but since neither is a perfect
substitute for deposits, banks will have to reduce lending. Investment funds that
fully finance their operations via equity are not affected by this channel. Because
high interest rates incentivize savers to search for high-yielding assets, by adjusting
creditor compensation, investment funds can increase their funding, which results
in an increase in lending. Investment funds are able to do this, because their
return on lending normally increases, which they can pass on to their investors
as equity returns. The increase in shadow bank lending is likely due to banks
channeling more resources via off-balance sheet institutions that they own and
control, which is a form of regulatory arbitrage. However, I am unable to fully
determine these channels in the context of my empirical strategy. To explore these
empirical results further, I turn to a theoretical approach.
The incorporation of financial frictions into theoretical models was a dominant
theme in the 1990s (Blanchard, 2000), but was not considered a core feature in
the models of the new neoclassical synthesis that combined new classical and new
Keynesian macroeconomics (Woodford, 2009). The literature on financial frictions
8
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again flourished during the global financial crisis and has maintained a prominent
status since then. Financial frictions can be modeled implicitly via inefficiencies or
explicitly by including an agent that represents the financial sector. Many models
with dedicated banking sectors exist (Guerrieri et al., 2015), some of which allow
consideration of more than one financial entity (e.g., Verona et al., 2013). I am
interested in modeling the behavior of three distinct types of financial entities,
since they all differ institutionally and behave in different ways empirically as is
shown in the first chapter. In addition, current regulatory proposals are likely to
affect these three groups in different ways, necessitating finer granularity.
One of the major distinctions I propose is the reliance of investment funds on
equity. Most existing models, however, feature financial institutions that rely
mostly or solely on debt finance, as is indeed the case for banks and similar
institutions. Although the selected framework, the model with financial frictions
of Bernanke et al. (1999), features an institution that leverages up its liabilities,
the equity portion of the balance sheet is not determined by the agents. This
ignores optimizing behavior and reactions to shocks, which could well matter for
macroeconomic dynamics. The incorporation and analysis of equity financing in
the workhorse model of Bernanke et al. (1999) is the focus of the third chapter.
This distinction matters, since the monetary transmission mechanism operates
differently via the liability components of the intermediaries.
In the fourth chapter I incorporate the three financial institutions as distinct
agents into a monetary DSGE model by using the theoretical extension developed
in chapter three. I contrast the behavior of the model economy from that of
Gertler and Karadi (2011), a model that features only one aggregate financial
sector, which ignores the sectoral heterogeneity. If we consider an economy during
normal times, the effects of the same monetary policy shock are comparable across
models, although aggregate credit intermediation with NBFI is muted compared
to Gertler and Karadi (2011). By adjusting parameters that govern the elasticities
of credit intermediation to monetary policy shocks, one could incorporate only one
large financial system that ignores the sectoral heterogeneity, but corresponds to
my empirical results.
This result does not hold anymore if the economy is at a demand-induced Zero
Lower Bound (ZLB). Nominal interest rates, which are the basis of credit remu-
neration (including deposits), cannot go much below zero and therefore cannot
induce additional consumption, investment and dissavings. Equity returns, on the
other hand, are generally higher than credit returns (Mehra and Prescott, 1985)
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and can therefore decrease for a longer period, eliciting spending even when net
nominal rates are bound by zero. Allowing for the heterogeneity then becomes
crucial, as lenders funded by equity continue to stimulate aggregate credit as well
as the economy, while debt-funded lenders do not. Consequently, having a finan-
cial system that is regulated to facilitate equity funding of intermediaries over debt
funding is helpful when an economy is at the ZLB. This key result is explained in
the final chapter.
10
chapter 2
THE REACTION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO
MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS – AN EMPIRICAL
EXPLORATION
How do different types of financial institutions respond to changes in the monetary
policy rate? Counter to the credit channel of monetary transmission, I show in
a Bayesian Vector Autoregression that an increase in the monetary policy rate of
100 basis points raises credit intermediation by two different types of non-bank
financial institutions (NBFI): investment funds increase lending by 4 percent and
shadow banks increase lending by 1 percent. Credit intermediation by banks is
reduced by about 0.5 percent. The movement in opposite directions is explained
by the difference in funding between banks and NBFI. This finding suggests that
the existence of NBFI may decrease aggregate volatility following monetary policy
shocks. In addition, it offers an explanation for why lending since the financial
crisis has been sluggish and suggests potential options for relief in case the lower
bound on monetary policy is binding.
11
2.1. Introduction
2.1 Introduction
The credit channel posits that following monetary tightening the amount of credit
in an economy is reduced, which amplifies traditional interest rate and asset price
channels. However, while empirical studies find that banks decrease lending, non-
bank financial institutions (NBFI) increase credit intermediation.1 In the past
decades, the share of real economy credit intermediated by NBFI has grown sub-
stantially, even overtaking the traditional commercial banking sector in several
countries, see Financial Stability Board (2014). In this paper, I explore how and
why different financial institutions react differently to monetary policy tightening.
For this purpose, I estimate a Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) that in-
cludes variables for volumes and prices of different credit markets, which allows
me to assess the relevance of supply and demand factors.
One part of the credit channel is the bank lending channel. It posits that the
amount of loanable funds available to banks will decrease after monetary policy
tightening, because of an outflow in deposit funding. If banks can substitute into
non-deposit funding, the bank lending channel is weakened (Kashyap and Stein,
1995). In a related sense, if the real sector can substitute non-bank funding for
bank credit, policy tightening would not have as large an effect on aggregate credit
supply (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). Because the supply schedule of bank lend-
ing cannot be observed, an alternative argument can be made that the demand
schedule is moved inwards after monetary tightening, because potential borrowers
anticipate a weaker economy and postpone debt-funded consumption and invest-
ment. In the following, I try to disentangle the supply and demand factors. This
will also allow me to make suggestions about what financial institutions are less
inhibited by the zero lower bound on monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I
will explain my data sources. Section 3 contains the specification of the VAR and
identification of monetary policy shocks, as well as my results and a comparison to
the literature. I explore robustness of my specification in Section 4 and conclude
in Section 5.
1See e.g., Pescatori and Sole (2016); Nelson et al. (2015); Igan et al. (2013); den Haan and
Sterk (2011); Altunbas et al. (2009).
12
Chapter 2. Empirical Reaction to Monetary Policy Shocks
2.2 Data
Data from the real economy include GDP, the CPI, an index of sensitive commod-
ity prices, money stock M2, total central bank reserves and non-borrowed reserves
as in Christiano et al. (1999).2 The data are from Stock and Watson (2012). Data
on GDP is available quarterly, while the other variables are measured in a higher
frequency. For the baseline specification, I will use data from 1960 to 2006. I do
not use data after 2006, because the zero lower bound on monetary policy was
binding, which complicates the identification of monetary policy shocks. Also,
the financial crisis likely resulted in a change in regulation and perception of the
financial industry, which could introduce structural breaks in the parameters. A
structural break in the conduct of monetary policy between the pre- and post-
Volcker chairmanship of the Federal Reserve is often argued, see Clarida et al.
(2000). I will therefore conduct a robustness analysis for my baseline specification
in Section 2.5.1.
Data for the financial sector variables are from the Financial Accounts of the
United States, which offer sectoral data on different types of lending. In this paper
I define shadow banks as intermediaries that are active in markets with securitized
assets and that are generally funded by other institutional investors and banks. In
this specification, they are ABS Issuers, Security Brokers and Dealers, Financing
Companies and Funding Corporations. Investment funds are open ended funds
that issue and redeem fund shares directly, instead of having their shares traded
in a market. They are generally accessible by households. Open ended funds are
Mutual Funds and Money Market Funds. Banks take deposits from households
and originate loans directly. They are U.S. Depository Institutions and Credit
Unions.
In the baseline specification I include loans, bonds, consumer credit and com-
mercial paper as a measure of credit. Intermediaries typically fund substantial
amounts of securities issued by the government and municipalities, as well as
asset-backed securities (ABS) backed by government-sponsored entities (GSE). I
purposely exclude these items in the measure of real economy credit since securi-
ties with implicit or explicit government guarantees are often assumed for liquidity
reasons and to be used as collateral; and may therefore serve a different purpose
than to profit from lending. I will include these items in one specification to
illuminate their general behavior and to allow comparisons with the literature.
To understand whether changes in lending are demand or supply driven, I take
2For a list of data sources and definitions, see Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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the baseline specification and add data on interest rates one at a time, following the
marginal approach by Christiano et al. (1996) and Kim (2001). Bank borrowing
rates are proxied by the prime lending rate from the FRED database. Investment
fund interest rates are proxied by investment fund returns, which are the averages
of total returns per share weighted by the equity of each fund. Data are taken
from the CRSP database and are available monthly.
In order to explore the reason behind the opposing directions of different types
of intermediaries, I will include variables on intermediary funding. Banks offer
checkable deposits as well as time and savings deposits. Investment funds offer
money market fund shares and mutual fund shares. Households are generally not
able to directly fund shadow banks.
The availability of sectoral balance sheet data dictates an analysis at the quar-
terly frequency. All USD-denominated variables have been transformed into logs
and are included in the BVAR in levels. Intermediary credit has been deflated
using the CPI. Interest rates are not transformed.
2.3 Empirical strategy
2.3.1 Vector Autoregression
As explained in Christiano et al. (1999) and Ramey (2016), the data can be de-
scribed by a multivariate vector autoregression of the form
Zt = B1Zt−1 +B2Zt−2 + ...+BqZt−q + ut. (2.1)
The k-dimensional vector of variables Zt can be described by lagged variables
of order q with matrices of coefficients Bi (i ∈ 1, ..., q). The differences between
the actual realizations of Zt and the predicted values on the right-hand side of
Equation 2.1 are the one-step ahead forecast errors ut, which are uncorrelated
with past variables. Forecast errors capture all of the unexpected movements in the
variables due to fundamental shocks. However, each element of ut summarizes the
contemporaneous effects of all fundamental shocks on the corresponding element
of Zt.
The purpose of this study is to identify fundamental shocks in the form of mon-
etary policy shocks. I assume that the forecast errors ut are a linear combination
of fundamental shocks εt with the relationship expressed by
14
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A0ut = εt.
Premultiplying the reduced-form VAR system in Equation 2.1 with the matrix
A0 transforms it into a structural VAR of the form
A0Zt = A1Zt−1 + A2Zt−2 + ...+ AqZt−q + εt, (2.2)
with Ai = A0Bi. The matrix A0 can be found by assuming that the monetary
authority’s decision making is based on an information set Ωt and shocks are
orthogonal to this set.
2.3.2 Identification via the recursiveness assumption
The baseline analysis concerns the reaction of real sector lending by intermediaries
to monetary policy shocks. I follow Christiano et al. (1999) in the selection of
variables and the identification of shocks by assuming that the monetary policy
makers choose their target for the federal funds rate based on their information
set Ωt. Variables contained in Ωt are contemporaneous measures for GDP, the
CPI and the index of sensitive commodity prices. These variables are captured
in the vector X1t. The remaining variables are M2 money stock, total reserves,
non-borrowed reserves and the amount of lending for each intermediary, which
make up the vector X2t. Policymakers observe the second set of variables only
with a lag of one period.
Assuming the vector of variables Zt is constructed as Zt = (X
′
1t, St, X
′
2t)
′ with
St being the monetary policy variable, I can incorporate the timing assumptions
into the information set by setting the block matrix A0 to
A0 =
a11 0 0a21 a22 0
a31 a32 a33
 . (2.3)
Variables in the first block of Zt are only affected by fundamental shocks in
X1t. Because they are slow moving, they do not respond to contemporary shocks
of the remaining variables in Zt. This is captured by the 3× 3 matrix a11 and the
zero restrictions on the remaining variables in the first row of matrix A0. Monetary
policy does react to shocks to the first block, captured by a21. It cannot react to the
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second block X2t, which necessitates zero restrictions on the remaining variables.
Fast moving variables in X2t potentially respond to all shocks. Since I am only
interested in the effects of monetary policy shocks, the ordering of variables within
their blocks does not matter.
I use the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) as a proxy for monetary policy. In the
baseline setup, the variables in the second block can respond contemporaneously to
monetary policy shocks. The argument can be made that intermediaries take time
to analyze and respond to changes in monetary policy. In that case, they should
be ordered in the first block of variables before the FFR. In order to explore the
robustness of my baseline assumption, I will transfer intermediary balance sheets
into the first block in Section 2.5.2. I use a lag order of 4 to capture the dynamic
properties of the quarterly data set.
Because of the large number of parameters resulting from the many variables
and lags chosen, I adopt an estimation approach with Bayesian shrinkage of VAR
parameters as in Koop and Korobilis (2010) and Banbura et al. (2010). I report
the percentage change of variables in the impulse response functions compared
to the unshocked path. I include confidence intervals at the 68 percent and 95
percent level.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The reaction of intermediary lending to monetary
innovations
The first exercise concerns the general adequacy of the identification to capture
monetary policy shocks. I take the maximum amount of data (1960I:2006IV) and
consider the reaction of all variables used by Christiano et al. (1999) and all assets
(real and public sector credit as well as equity holdings) of the three intermediaries
in response to a monetary tightening in Figure 2.1. After an increase in the FFR of
100bp, GDP falls in a hump-shaped way to a maximum of about minus 0.6 percent
after two years. The CPI exhibits the price puzzle: it increases initially, before it
falls after about 10 quarters. The index of commodity prices exhibits a quicker
reaction and falls after about four quarters. Non-borrowed reserves fall, while
total reserves stay constant initially. This suggests that the monetary authority
increases borrowed reserves to insulate the drop in total reserves, as argued by
Christiano et al. (1999). These results are all in line with the established literature.
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Figure 2.1: Responses of intermediary assets to a contractionary monetary policy
shock. Note: Shaded regions are the 32-68th and 5-95th percentage confidence
regions.
Banks decrease their balance sheets in a hump-shaped manner to a negative
one percent after about eight periods. In the very first period, their balance sheets
increase slightly, which may be attributable to an increase in borrowing by bank
clients with pre-established credit lines. These loans made under commitment
increase after tightening, because borrowers anticipate an increase in the cost of
obtaining credit elsewhere (Morgan, 1998). Shadow banks initially increase their
balance sheets by about 0.6 percent during the first year, before they decrease their
assets in years two to four. Investment funds increase their assets persistently by
about 1.8 percent starting three quarters after the shock.
The reaction of investment funds to monetary policy becomes more clear when
we focus on fixed income assets to the private sector, instead of considering the
whole balance sheet. Figure 2.2 shows the results of what I call the baseline spec-
ification for the remainder of the analysis. After a 100bp increase in the FFR,
investment funds increase their fixed income holdings quickly by about 4 percent.
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Intermediation stays elevated for about two years, before it slowly drops to the
unshocked path around 16 quarters after the shock. Banks do not decrease fixed
income credit as quickly, which might be due to an increase in loans under com-
mitment, as argued above (Morgan, 1998). Fixed income credit held by shadow
banks increases by one percent.
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Figure 2.2: Responses of fixed income credit holdings by intermediaries to a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock. Note: This is the baseline specification. The
full BVAR is available in the Appendix, Figure A.1.
Table 2.1 shows the forecast error variance decompositions of some key vari-
ables to monetary policy shocks. The results are broadly comparable with the
literature, however output variance is less affected in this analysis, while CPI is
more affected than in Christiano et al. (1999). The difference might be due to
the larger data sample used here (1960Q1:2006Q4 versus 1965Q3:1995Q2) or due
to the difference in estimation via Bayesian priors. Interestingly, monetary policy
shocks can explain a much larger share of the variance of investment fund lend-
ing than lending by commercial banks and shadow banks. The higher sensitivity
might be due to operations of investment funds being more focused on credit inter-
mediation and similar investment operations. This compares to the much broader
services commercial banks offer, which might allow them to cross subsidize credit
operations. Another plausible stabilizer is bank funding in the form of deposits,
which are less interest sensitive because they are used for reasons other than sav-
ings. This understanding is more difficult to reconcile with shadow banks, which
are narrowly focused. Being owned and controlled by bank holding companies
would also speak for a similar type of cross subsidization.
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Horizon 2 4 8 12 16 20
GDP 2 6 21 28 29 29
CPI 3 4 3 2 3 8
FFR 73 45 32 29 29 29
Commercial bank lending 2 1 1 2 2 2
Investment fund lending 11 24 29 28 26 24
Shadow bank lending 3 8 4 4 4 3
Table 2.1: Variance decomposition for key variables – share of variance explained
by monetary policy shocks, 1960Q1 to 2006Q4 (all numbers in percent).
2.4.2 Identifying supply and demand factors
In order to answer the question why investment funds increase lending while banks
decrease lending, it is necessary to understand whether the change in credit vol-
umes are due to the supply or the demand side: banks may reduce lending because
they prefer to shrink their balance sheet, or because there is not sufficient demand
from borrowers. This can be pictured in a simple supply and demand diagram.
If the reduction in credit is mainly due to a reduction in credit supply, we would
expect an increase in the price, or the interest rate, that borrowers have to pay
(left hand side of Figure 2.3).
Credit Volume
Credit Price / interest rate
Loan Supply
Loan Demand
Credit Volume
Credit Price / interest rate
Loan Supply
Loan Demand
Figure 2.3: Exemplary supply and demand schedules on the credit market.
Including the price introduces new parameters that have to be estimated. Since
the number of observations does not increase, the confidence bands around the
impulse response function will necessarily widen. As a proxy for the interest rate
that banks charge, I include the bank prime loan rate. Figure 2.4 shows that it
increases by about 0.8 percent and moves in line with the FFR. Together with
the initial increase in credit, this suggests that demand for bank credit initially
increases (the loan demand schedule is moved outward). After five periods, the
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volume drops below the baseline but the price stays elevated. That points to a
reduction in the supply of credit as in the diagram.
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Figure 2.4: Responses of bank credit price and volume. Note: Full BVAR is
available in the Appendix, Figure A.2.
Including the interest rate for investment fund lending allows the analysis of
supply and demand factors in that market. There is no simple proxy for investment
fund interest rates on the lending side. I instead take gross returns of investment
funds as a proxy. In the period of the monetary tightening shock, investment fund
returns drop below the baseline by a statistically significant amount, see Figure
2.5. However, the drop of 0.004 percent is not economically significant and the
subsequent movement is negligible. Given the increase in investment fund credit,
this result is consistent with a simultaneous increase in credit supply and demand,
see the right hand side of Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.5: Responses of fund credit price and volume. Note: Full BVAR is
available in the Appendix, Figure A.3.
An increase in credit demand at investment funds makes sense, given that
bank credit becomes more expensive and eventually drops altogether. This could
be due to some borrowers moving away from the banking sector to investment
funds. Since investment fund returns stay flat, this suggests that investment fund
credit supply also rises. How does this come about? In order to explain the
increase in credit supply, we need to look at the funding side of credit institutions.
First, I include funding sources for banks. I differentiate between checkable
deposits, small time and savings deposits, and large time deposits, because they
are different savings devices from the creditors’ perspective as they have different
interest rates, maturities and risk profiles. Figure 2.6 shows that deposits and
small time and savings account decrease for eight and six periods, respectively.
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Figure 2.6: Responses of bank funding. Note: Full BVAR is available in the
Appendix, Figure A.4.
Both increase after two to three years, before they return to the baseline. Large
time deposits increase and stay elevated for several years, but not statistically
significantly at the 95 percent level.
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0
2
4
Investment Funds
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
Figure 2.7: Responses of investment fund shareholdings. Note: Full BVAR is
available in the Appendix, Figure A.5.
Shareholdings in investment funds increase, see Figure 2.7. This result corre-
sponds with the hypothesis that investment funds do not increase lending rates
after a monetary tightening, since they have more resources to conduct interme-
diation.
2.4.3 Comparison with results from the literature
Nelson et al. (2015) conduct a similar analysis of the reaction of intermediary
balance sheets to monetary policy shocks, but differ in a number of important
ways: They look at the change in the total size of the balance sheet instead of
one asset class (fixed income holdings with the real sector as in this paper). This
is an imperfect measure when one is interested in the effectiveness of the credit
channel, as financial intermediaries are invested in equity as well as government
and municipal debt, which are often held for collateral purposes. Secondly, they
estimate their VAR in first differences, which results in an interpretation about
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the asset growth instead of the change in assets. Lastly, their definition of shadow
banks does not include security brokers and dealers. Nonetheless, their results are
complementary to the ones in this paper: commercial bank asset growth drops
after monetary tightening, while shadow bank asset growth increases.
In a Factor-Augmented VAR, Igan et al. (2013) study the effects of monetary
policy shocks on intermediary balance sheets. Because of their differing methodol-
ogy, they include over one hundred variables, but limit themselves to the time from
1990Q1 to 2008Q2. Regarding the variables of interest, they similarly find that
one type of investment fund, money market funds, increase assets after monetary
tightening. A type of shadow bank, security brokers and dealers, also increase
assets. Another type of shadow bank, ABS issuers, decrease both mortgages and
total liabilities, i.e., one variable that I exclude (mortgages) and another variable
that is too broad for my purposes (total assets/liabilities).
Pescatori and Sole (2016) estimate a VAR with banks, ABS issuers and fi-
nance companies, but also include government sponsored entities (GSE), agency
and GSE-backed mortgage pools and life insurance companies. The focus of the
analysis is on GSE, which reduce own asset holdings but finance off-balance sheet
assets. The authors conclude that monetary tightening decreases aggregate credit
intermediation, but increases the relative sizes of non-banks, thereby potentially
increasing systemic risk by pushing credit intermediation to less regulated sectors.
den Haan and Sterk (2011) analyze whether financial innovation is responsible
for the Great Moderation. They estimate the response of mortgage and consumer
credit held by banks and non-banks. Although they ultimately reject the hy-
pothesis that financial innovation has led to reduced volatility in real variables,
their results regarding the reaction of credit to monetary tightening corresponds
with the results in this paper: Bank mortgages and consumer credit decline or
stay relatively flat, respectively, after monetary policy tightening, while non-bank
holdings increase. An important observation is that there is a trend break around
the Volcker chairmanship of the Fed, which I take into account in the robustness
analysis in Section 2.5.1.
In line with these results, Altunbas et al. (2009) show that European banks that
rely more on securitization are less affected by monetary policy shocks. This result
makes sense in light of the above evidence when one considers European banks to
consist of a dedicated banking part and a non-bank part. A higher concentration of
predominantly non-bank activities insulated the reaction of credit intermediation
to monetary tightening.
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2.5 Robustness
2.5.1 Shortened Time Horizon: Great Moderation
The time series literature generally agrees that there have been breaks in the trend
of several macroeconomic variables over the past decades, but the exact date is
not clear (Boivin et al., 2002). Following the literature, I will estimate my baseline
VAR, but with a reduced data range of the time after the high inflation years of
the Volcker Fed chairmanship. Starting with the year 1984 has another benefit:
Regulation Q, which prohibits banks from raising deposit rates above a ceiling,
was phased out in the early 1980s. Regulation Q is often understood as a driver
for the development of alternative forms of savings, predominantly money market
mutual funds (Gilbert, 1986).
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Figure 2.8: Responses of intermediaries during the Great Moderation. Note:
Baseline specification with data from 1984I:2006IV.
Figure 2.8 shows the result for the baseline BVAR for the shortened time
horizon 1984I:2006IV. The reaction of the three intermediaries is qualitatively
comparable. Banks now react more strongly quantitatively to the shock: they
23
2.5. Robustness
reduce credit by just over 4 percent. Investment funds react with more of a
lag, only raising credit after three periods, but more strongly by over 5 percent.
Shadow bank credit increases more strongly, too, but not statistically significantly
at the 95 percent level. The reduction after seven periods is also stronger than in
the longer sample.
Real variables behave broadly the same as in the longer horizon, but with a
higher amplitude in response to a shock. This is probably due to the behavior of
the FFR being more persistent in response to a monetary tightening. Secondly,
the volatility of the monetary shocks time series in the years 1984 to 2006 is 0.39,
compared to a higher volatility in the years 1960 to 1977 of 0.59, see Figure 2.9.3
This corresponds with Boivin et al. (2002) and indicates that monetary policy has
become more systematic in response to the data included in the VAR.4
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Figure 2.9: Monetary shock time series. Note: Extracted from the baseline BVAR.
The vertical axis shows units in terms of the standard deviation of the shock. The
red, hatched line indicates data that is excluded in the calculation of the monetary
shock volatility.
The great moderation did not only see a reduction in the overall variance of
macroeconomic variables, but also in the share that can be attributed to monetary
policy shocks. This can be seen in Table 2.2, which again indicates a reduction in
the unsystematic part of monetary policy. Another interesting development is that
only up to a horizon of three years is lending by investment funds more strongly
affected by monetary policy shocks than lending by commercial banks and shadow
3I exclude data around the high inflation period and strong interest rate intervention by Paul
Volcker. Extending the time horizon until 1984 would increase the volatility of the monetary
shock time series to 1.40.
4This depends on the interpretation of an empirical monetary policy shock, which can alter-
natively be understood as shifts in the weight given to varying goals by the monetary authority
(Christiano et al., 1999) or include factors like ”personalities and intellectual predilections of the
policy-makers, politics, data errors and revisions, and various technical problems” as argued by
Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
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banks. At the four and five year horizons, the latter two intermediaries’ variance
decomposition is higher than that of investment funds. This might be due to the
increased reliance by banks on wholesale funding markets.
Horizon 2 4 8 12 16 20
GDP 0 0 1 9 17 22
CPI 1 0 1 3 3 4
FFR 83 62 32 26 30 32
Commercial bank lending 0 0 1 6 13 18
Investment fund lending 1 6 14 11 9 12
Shadow bank lending 1 3 3 5 9 15
Table 2.2: Variance decomposition for key variables – share of variance explained
by monetary policy shocks, 1984Q1 to 2006Q4 (all numbers in percent).
2.5.2 Ordering of variables: intermediary balance sheets
before the FFR
The argument can be made that information processing and execution in compa-
nies takes time and intermediary balance sheets should therefore be ordered in the
first block of variables that can only respond to monetary policy with a lag of one
period. Figure 2.10 shows that commercial banks do not increase lending in the
initial periods anymore, which is more in line with the credit channel of monetary
transmission. Credit intermediation by investment funds is virtually unchanged
from the baseline result. Shadow bank credit intermediation does not increase as
much but still peaks around 0.7 percent three periods after monetary tightening.
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Figure 2.10: Responses of intermediaries ordered before the FFR. Note: Baseline
specification.
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2.5.3 Including mortgages in measures of credit
I exclude mortgages in my measures of credit, because they are the focus of a
number of other studies. For completeness, Figure 2.11 shows the result when
mortgages are added to the measure of credit.
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Figure 2.11: Responses of intermediaries when including mortgages in the mea-
sure of credit. Note: Baseline specification.
The reaction of banks is more clearly in line with the credit channel, compared
to the baseline case, because credit is reduced more quickly. Investment fund
credit including mortgages reacts slightly less than without mortgages. Shadow
bank credit including mortgages initially reacts the same but does not fall below
the baseline as much as without mortgages.
2.6 Conclusion
After monetary tightening shocks, banks decrease the amount of credit intermedi-
ation due to a decrease in the amount of funding they receive, which corresponds
to the bank lending channel of monetary transmission. Investment funds, on the
other hand, receive an inflow in funding, which allows them to increase credit in-
termediation. The results are robust to a change in the time horizon, the measure
of credit, and the ordering of the variables in the VAR.
One key take away from the impulse responses of the different intermediaries
is as follows. Since the financial crisis, credit creation has been weak, adding to
the sluggishness of the recovery. At the same time, monetary policy has been near
its zero lower bound, while the natural rate has been likely below zero (Tallman
and Zaman, 2012). Interpreting the difference in the natural and the actual rate
as a monetary policy tightening ’shock’, the situation of the past years has led
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banks to decrease lending, while NBFI increase lending. Since the financial crisis,
many shadow banks have defaulted or been eliminated by regulation. The analysis
suggests that the reduction in credit might be due to the absence of this shadow
banking sector. If an increase in credit is desirable, monetary authorities facing the
zero lower bound might benefit from a larger NBFI sector. Given the potentially
destructive nature of some types of shadow banking institutions, investment funds
would be the more agreeable solution. This interpretation has to be taken with
caution, since the data in the analysis do not include the zero lower bound episode.
However, this possibility should be explored in a structural analysis that is able
to replicate these findings and that takes account of general equilibrium effects,
which is not possible in this reduced form exercise.
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chapter 3
ENDOGENOUS FIRM ENTRY IN FINANCIAL
ACCELERATOR MODELS
Does the financial accelerator still hold if the key variable, net worth of en-
trepreneurs, is endogenously chosen conditional on the business cycle? The answer
is yes. I microfound the mechanism in Bernanke et al. (1999) by which new net
worth in entrepreneurs is created. Households face a savings decision between
state contingent and non-state contingent assets. Although the propagation of
some key variables is significantly altered, the macroeconomic consequences re-
main broadly the same. A Bayesian estimation suggests a change in the survival
rate of entrepreneurs, affecting impulse responses. The analysis suggests that
models that use the financial accelerator should include endogenous firm entry if
variables regarding household portfolios or shocks directly affecting firm net worth
are considered.
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3.1 Introduction
The Financial Accelerator by Bernanke et al. (1999) (henceforth BGG) has been
extensively used and further developed in models that analyze financial frictions.
Underlying the original analysis and much of its offspring is the assumption that
borrowing constrained agents (entrepreneurs in BGG, financial intermediaries in
other models) have a finite lifetime. This assumption is essential, since these agents
would otherwise eventually accumulate enough wealth to escape their borrowing
constraints. To facilitate aggregation, agents have a constant survival probability
and new agents are born to make up for the outflow. This inflow, however, is
not derived from agents’ optimization, which leads to a law of motion for wealth
that is not conditional on the state of the economy and may therefore affect aggre-
gate dynamics in ways incompatible with utility-maximizing agents. Furthermore,
BGG explain that the law of motion for net wealth is crucial, since it directly pins
down the financial accelerator.
If new firms enter the market whenever there are any profit opportunities, fi-
nancial frictions between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries may be elim-
inated or at least reduced. Can the financial accelerator remain a driving force
of macroeconomic fluctuations? The answer this paper suggests is yes: as long as
entrepreneurs require outside equity funding and as long as fund suppliers (house-
holds) have a reason to discriminate among start-ups, model dynamics of the
financial accelerator still hold. However, depending on the type of shock, sev-
eral key variables are significantly affected. It is therefore worthwhile to allow for
endogenous firm entry when the model relies on these variables for interpretation.
In this paper, I will endogenize the inflow of new firms, consistent with expec-
tations about the economy. If agents could freely invest into new equity, borrowing
constraints would again become non-binding, necessitating a friction. Following
Wasmer and Weil (2004), I model funding market frictions analogously to those
on the labor market because of their comparable characteristics of moral haz-
ard, heterogeneity and specificity: Every period, potential entrant firms search
for funding. The ultimate savers in the economy, infinitely lived households, ran-
domly meet with potential entrants and evaluate the potential for a match. Not
all meetings turn into a match, since households may dislike the individual char-
acteristics of the potential entrant. From the macroeconomic perspective these
dynamics are expressed via the search and matching framework as a microeco-
nomically based theory of the aggregate equity markets. On the funding demand
side, potential entrants take the current state of the economy into account. If firm
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entry is profitable, more potential entrants will search for funding. On the funding
supply side, households compare returns from new ventures with the rest of their
portfolio. Households now face a trade-off: they can earn a higher interest rate
on equity, but only if they find a good match. Only good matches will turn into
new entrepreneurs.
The paper offers three contributions to the literature. First, firm entry is
endogenized by allowing potential entrepreneurs to consider the current state and
expectations over the economy. Second, this gives rise to households’ motivation
to fund new firms and a corresponding savings decision between risky equity and
safe debt. Third, the setup has a natural interpretation of the equity premium
puzzle and the risk free rate puzzle, which allows estimation of the key parameter
under study: the fraction of surviving firms. The model suggests a much lower
value and a resulting modification of impulse response functions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 derives the
endogenous firm entry extension to the original BGG model. Section 3 contains
the calibration and Bayesian estimation of parameters. Section 4 discusses the
results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Extension of Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999)
In BGG, firms finance their physical capital via net worth (or ’equity’, which I
will use interchangeably) and borrowing. The law of motion for aggregate en-
trepreneurial net worth at the end of period t is
Nt+1 = γVt +W
e
t , (BGG.4.7)
where γ is the fraction of surviving entrepreneurs, and W et is the entrepreneurial
wage. The entrepreneurial equity Vt is given by the difference between the return
on physical capital and borrowing costs:
Vt = R
k
tQt−1Kt − (Rt + EFPt)(Qt−1Kt −Nt), (BGG.4.8)
with the return to capital Rkt , the risk free rate Rt, productive capital Kt, the
price of capital Qt and the external finance premium EFPt. Loans make up the
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remainder of the funding:
Bt = Qt−1Kt −Nt (BGG.3.2)
New firms enter the economy to counteract the outflow. BGG assume that
”the birth rate of entrepreneurs to be such that the fraction of agents who are
entrepreneurs is constant”. This assumptions neglects the entrepreneurial sector’s
ability to react to the current state and expectations about the economy. Instead
of holding the fraction of agents constant, I allow an endogenous choice of entry.
Potential entrepreneurs in need of equity funding pitch their projects to households
on the funding market. If a household agrees to fund a potential entrepreneur,
they will form a match. I abstract from the entrepreneurs’ ability to work1. The
new law of motion for net worth is then
Nt+1 = γVt +matchest. (3.1)
Individual savers with liquid assets in the form of deposits Dt+1 and individual
potential entrepreneurs searching for funds with a project pitch vt randomly meet
and evaluate the potential for a match in isolation. In the aggregate, this behavior
is approximated via a matching technology. Assuming a constant returns to scale
matching function
matchest = m(vt, Dt+1) = sv
1−η
t D
η
t+1,
the probability qt that a potential entrepreneur will find suitable equity funding
is the number of matches per project pitch:
qt =
m(vt, Dt+1)
vt
= s
(
vt
Dt+1
)−η
. (E.1)
The probability ft that a household will find a suitable investment is the num-
ber of matches per existing deposits:
ft =
m(vt, Dt+1)
Dt+1
= s
(
vt
Dt+1
)1−η
(E.2)
with matching elasticity η and matching efficiency s.
1Entrepreneurial labor is included in BGG as a ’technical matter’ and subsequently ignored
in the complete log-linearized system of equations, since it only enters the production function
with a share of ((1− α)(1− Ω) =) 0.0065..
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3.2.1 Allowing potential entrepreneurs to search for
equity funding
Potential entrepreneurs looking to establish a new firm need to find ”start up”
equity funding for the acquisition of physical capital by pitching their projects.2
Every potential entrepreneur searches for one unit of equity funding. In case a
potential entrepreneur finds funding, they can leverage up. Their gross return
on capital Rkt is then multiplied by the leverage rate K/N and the borrowing
costs are multiplied by the fraction of funding that comes from loans B/N . The
value of their operations EMt will be their leveraged gross return on capital, net of
borrowing costs and equity dividends RNt plus the value of staying matched in the
subsequent period. With a probability γ the matched entrepreneur will keep their
funding and be able to reap profits one period hence, while the firm will cease to
exist and the entrepreneur will have to look for new funding otherwise.
EMt =
K
N
Rkt −
B
N
RBt −RNt + βEtΛt,t+1
{
γ EMt+1 +(1− γ)E St+1
}
. (3.2)
Potential entrepreneurs that are searching for funding have a value E St made
up of search cost κ and the value of future operations weighted by the likelihood
of finding a match qt:
E St = −κ+ βEtΛt,t+1
{
qt E
M
t+1 +(1− qt)E St+1
}
. (3.3)
Being on the funding market is valuable, because of the expected future profit
opportunities in case of a match. If entering the funding market is costless apart
from the search cost κ, households will keep sending potential entrepreneurs to
participate until the rent from participation is zero. The free entry condition
E St = 0 and equation (3.2) result in
EMt =
K
N
Rkt −
B
N
RBt −RNt + γ
κ
qt
(3.4)
while (3.3) reduces to
κ
qt
= βEtΛt,t+1 EMt+1 . (3.5)
2The methodology follows Pissarides (2000).
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Combining (3.4) and (3.5) results in the vacancy posting condition
κ
qt
= βEtΛt,t+1
{
K
N
Rkt+1 −
B
N
RBt+1 −RNt+1 + γ
κ
qt+1
}
. (E.3)
Potential entrepreneurs will enter the funding market until the cost of finding
a match κ
qt
is equal to the benefit of having established a firm, which is the future
discounted profits as well as the expected value of not having to look for new
funding in the following period.
3.2.2 Allowing households to invest in entrepreneurial
equity
A continuum of households of measure one exists, which consume, save and supply
labor.3 As in BGG, households can save in deposits Dt+1 at financial intermedi-
aries on which they earn the riskless rate Rt+1 because the intermediary perfectly
diversifies the risk from lending to firms. In addition to safe debt, households
can invest in risky equity of entrepreneurs Nt+1. In contrast to deposits, equity
is state contingent. Households are looking for a potential entrepreneur with a
project that fits into their individual investment portfolio. The idiosyncratic risks
of the same project may be a good fit for the portfolio of one household but a poor
fit for another. The equity funding markets open at the end of the period. Since
meeting potential entrepreneurs is time consuming, only a share ft of searching
households will be able to establish a match every period. The resulting number
of matches is therefore the amount of deposits times the fraction of successful
matches. The law of motion for entrepreneurial equity (3.1) then becomes
Nt+1 = γ
[
RktQt−1Kt − (Rt + EFPt)(Qt−1Kt −Nt)
]
+ ftDt+1. (E.4)
The household problem can then be written as
max
{Ct,Dt+1,Nt+1,Ht}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
k=0
βk[ln(Ct+k + ξln(1−Ht+k)]
subject to (E.4) and the sequence of period budget constraints
Ct +D
e
t+1 +Nt+1 + Tt = WtHt + Πt +RtD
e
t +R
N
t Nt.
3BGG allows households to hold money, which does not affect the analysis. Likewise, I focus
on the cashless limit as in Woodford (2003).
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where Det+1 = (1− ft)Dt+1 are the effective deposits that have not been invested
in equity and that remain in banks. In equilibrium, households’ effective deposits
are available loans to entrepreneurs, Det = Bt. β is the discount factor, ξ is the
relative utility weight of labor. Πt are profits from retailers. With %t denoting
marginal utility of consumption and µt denoting marginal additional utility of
entrepreneurial equity over deposits, the first order conditions4 for deposits and
equity are given by, respectively,
%t = (1− ft)βEtRt+1%t+1 + ft(µt + %t) (E.5)
µt + %t = βEt
{
%t+1R
N
t+1 + γµt+1Rt+1
}
. (E.6)
Equation (E.5) reduces to the commonly known Euler condition in the case that
equity investments do not exist or have no additional value5, i.e., the household
will increase savings until the marginal utility of consumption today equals the
discounted expected marginal utility of consumption tomorrow. However, since
the household’s investment in equity is constrained, i.e. ft < 1, being invested in
equity is valuable, i.e. µt > 0. The household will therefore increase savings until
the marginal utility of consumption today equals the probability of consuming
tomorrow (1 − ft) times its value (the discounted expected marginal utility of
consumption tomorrow) plus the probability of investing in equity ft times that
value. The value of investing in equity is given by Equation (E.6), which shows
that the marginal utility of investing in equity µt + %t is tomorrow’s discounted
dividend weighted by marginal utility of consumption, as well as the future value
of staying matched.
3.2.3 Dividend Bargaining
Because of the existence of search frictions, entrepreneurs enjoy a rent on estab-
lished matches. I assume that the dividend entrepreneurs pay on funds raised is
determined via Nash bargaining over these surpluses. ω is the relative bargain-
ing power of households. Dividends RNt+1 are negotiated to maximize a convex
combination of the surpluses,
RNt+1 = argmax ω lnH t +(1− ω)lnE t .
The marginal surplus potential entrepreneurs stand to gain from starting a
4First-order conditions w.r.t. labor are standard.
5Iff µt=0, Equation (E.5) holds for all ft.
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firm is the difference between the value of an matched entrepreneur EM versus an
unmatched entrepreneur E S as defined in Equations (3.2) and (3.3). Assuming
free entry, the value of an Entrepreneur is
E t = E
M
t −E St =
K
N
Rkt −
B
N
RBt −RNt + γ
κ
qt
. (3.6)
For a household the value of being matched with a potential entrepreneur
H Mt is made up of the dividend R
N
t that they receive plus the future discounted
expected value of staying matched with the probability γ versus having to look
for new opportunities in case the firm dies with probability (1 − γ):
H Mt = R
N
t + βEtΛt,t+1{γH Mt+1 +(1− γ)H St+1}. (3.7)
The value of searching for good opportunities and saving the funds at the
financial intermediary at the risk less rate Rt in the meantime is
H St = Rt + βEtΛt,t+1[ftH
M
t+1 +(1− ft)H St+1], (3.8)
where they will find a suitable match in the next period with the probability ft
from Equation (E.1). The surplus from funding an entrepreneur is the difference
households receive in interest rates together with the value they have from staying
matched,
H t = H
M
t −H St = RNt −Rt + βEtΛt,t+1(γ − ft)H t+1 . (3.9)
The first-order condition for dividend bargaining can now be solved and is
ω
H t
=
(1− ω)
E t
. (3.10)
In order to solve for the dividend I need to eliminate H t+1 in Equation (3.9).
I can rewrite Equation (3.9) into
H t = R
N
t −Rt + (γ − ft)
ω
1− ω
κ
qt
(3.11)
by solving Equation (3.10) one period forward and substituting for E t+1 from
Equation (3.5).
Substitution Equations (3.6) and (3.11) into Equation (3.10) results in the
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dividend that entrepreneurs pay for funds raised:
RNt = Rt + ω
[
K
N
(Rkt −Rt) + κ
ft
qt
]
. (E.7)
If household bargaining power is zero, entrepreneurs can get away with paying
only the interest rate Rt+1 that banks pay on their deposits. With increasing
bargaining power, entrepreneurs need to share expected profits, i.e., the leveraged
net return on capital, and the value of staying matched with investing households,
i.e., the saved cost of having to look for funding in the following period.
3.2.4 Resources and Policy
The aggregate resource constraint from BGG is modified to reflect the cost of
posting vacancies
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + C
e
t + κvt. (E.8)
The monetary policy rule and shock processes are unchanged from BGG.
3.3 Parameterization
In this section, I will first describe some general characteristics of the model that
suggest statements about the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles. I will
then calibrate the model parameters, most of which are taken directly from BGG.
The model is solved via first order perturbation around the deterministic steady
state.
3.3.1 Implications for the risk free rate
The conventional household Euler condition requires the risk-free rate Rt+1 in equi-
librium to be equal to the reciprocal of the time-varying intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution6. In the deterministic steady state, the risk-free rate is there-
fore the reciprocal of the household discount rate. Contrast this with the House-
hold Euler Equation (E.5). Iff holding equity is more valuable than holding de-
posits (µt > 0), the risk-free rate is less than β
−1. Every unit of deposits has the
potential to be matched with an entrepreneur looking for funding. Households will
6Specifically,
Et{Rt+1} = 1Et{%t+1}
[
%t
β
− cov(Rt+1, %t+1)
]
.
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therefore hold liquid assets in the form of deposits not just to reap the risk-free
rate, but also to acquire firm equity. In equilibrium, this over-saving will result in
a risk-free rate that is lower than β−1.
Since each household does not necessarily find the desired equity investments
each period (ft < 1) and since firms eventually die (γ < 1) necessitating the
renewed search for appropriate equity investments, the equity return RNt+1 has a
premium over the risk-free rate.
The model therefore attributes the existence of the equity premium to house-
holds’ imperfect search for appropriate portfolio holdings. That the risk-free rate
is lower than common discount rates would suggest liquid assets (of which risk-
free assets like deposits are the most common type) are not only held for savings
purposes but also for readily investing in desired equity. Since the model has
interpretations of these two important puzzles in the macro-finance literature, I
will use data common to the equity premium puzzle first discussed by Mehra and
Prescott (1985).
3.3.2 Calibration
Most of the parameters have annualized values from the quarterly BGG model,
which I will not dicuss. The rest of the parameters using other sources are cali-
brated as follows.
For the steady state equity return RN , I use the real return on the S&P 500
stock index. Original data from 1889 to 1990 by Shiller (1992) are updated until
2004. Calculation follows the improved methodology by Kocherlakota (1996).
The steady state real return on risk-less savings are identified with the real return
on relatively risk-less securities as in Mehra and Prescott (1985). In order to
achieve a risk-less return that is lower than β−1, the steady state probability for a
household of finding suitable investments is about 20%. For symmetrical purposes,
the corresponding probability for potential entrepreneurs is set to the same value.
The annual risk spread on bank lending, Rk − R, is equal to 240 basis points
using the same methodology as BGG for the average yearly spread between the
prime lending rate and 6-month Treasury bill secondary market rate. The ratio of
capital over equity, K/N , is 3. Since firm debt makes up the remaining financing,
B/N is equal to 2. For a detailed description of the data, see Appendix B.4.
Several new parameters are introduced. For an equity price premium of 6% as
given in the data, the household bargaining power with respect to dividends, ω,
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has to be 0.63; the search cost κ has to be 0.019. The magnitude of the search cost
can be understood when looking at the value of establishing a match, Equation
(3.9), which consists of differences in interest rates. The search cost is higher than
the net risk-free rate, but lower than net borrowing or equity costs. If the search
cost were lower than the net risk-free rate, more potential entrepreneurs would
borrow from their respective households to participate in the funding market. If
the cost were higher than their borrowing and equity costs, it would never make
sense to establish a match. The matching elasticity η is not directly pinned down
by the data. I assume an efficient underinvestment in equity, i.e., the Hosios
condition, which implies that the elasticity of the matching function with respect
to deposits, η, equals the households’ share of the matching surplus, ω.
Symbol Value Description Source
Households
β 0.96 Discount rate BGG
φ 3 Labor supply elasticity BGG
f 0.2 StSt probability of finding equity MP
q 0.2 StSt probability of finding funding MP
ω 0.63 Household bargaining power data
Interest Rates
R 0.014 Real annual return on risk-less bond MP
RN 0.077 Real annual return on equity MP
Rk −R 0.024 Risk spread data
Economy
α 0.35 Capital share BGG
(1− α)(1− Ω) 0.64 Household labor share BGG
δ 0.1 Depreciation rate BGG
ψ 0.25 Elasticity of price adjustment BGG
γ 0.11 Death rate BGG
θ 0.5 Calvo price setting BGG
K/N 3 ratio of capital over equity data
B/N 2 ratio of debt over equity data
η 0.63 Matching elasticity data
κ 0.019 Search cost data
Government
G/Y 0.2 Steady state proportion of government expenditures BGG
κpi 0.11 Inflation coefficient of Taylor rule BGG
ρi 0.66 Smoothing parameter of the Taylor rule BGG
Shock Processes
ρg 0.81 Persistence Govt BGG
ρa 0.81 Persistence TFP as ρg
Table 3.1: Calibrated parameter values. Note: In the Source column, BGG refers
to parameter values from Bernanke et al. (1999) and MP refers to Mehra and
Prescott (1985).
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3.3.3 Estimation of the survival rate of entrepreneurs
BGG pin down the survival rate of entrepreneurs γ to 0.9728 quarterly to imply
some steady state outcomes. In fact, these outcomes are independent of γ. Given
the centrality of the parameter in this extension of the model, I will estimate γ
using Bayesian methods. I use data from the Mehra and Prescott (1985) study
on consumption, the risk-free rate and the equity return to arrive at a value of
γ = 0.55 (yearly), which translates into a γ = .89 on a quarterly basis, i.e., much
lower than in BGG.
Such a rate of firm ’deaths’ is implausibly high. In order to align the rate with
empirical realities I need to reinterpret the parameter. Given the model and the
data, this parameter can alternatively be understood as firm equity being acquired
by or merged with other firms.
3.4 Results
The basic mechanism of expansionary monetary policy shocks is the same as in
BGG and can be seen in the light blue, dash-dot line7 in Figure 3.1: after an
unanticipated decrease in the monetary policy rate, the demand for capital in-
creases. This stimulates investment and the price of capital. The unexpected
increase of return on capital raises entrepreneurial net worth, decreasing the ex-
ternal finance premium. This results in the well-known multiplier effect of the
financial accelerator.
The endogenous firm entry model has very comparable results for several im-
portant variables, including output, inflation, hours worked. However, it differs
from BGG in some key real and financial variables, including investment, net
worth and the EFP. The mechanism is as follows. Note that firms gain from a fall
in the EFP, because it becomes cheaper to find external finance. At the same time,
a low EFP means that starting new firms is not as profitable, since the return on
capital is only slightly higher than the risk-free rate, i.e., the EFP does not fall
as much as in BGG. An unexpected monetary policy rate decrease will therefore
result in fewer potential entrepreneurs looking for start-up funding. This results in
an increase in the equity finding rate. Likewise, households looking for appropri-
ate equity investments will have a harder time finding them. Aggregate net worth
does not increase as much and the EFP will stay higher. Capital investments will
7The difference in the IRFs to the BGG handbook chapter come from the difference in the
leverage, which BGG pin down at 2 while in the data I find 3 to be a more applicable leverage.
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Figure 3.1: Monetary Policy Shock
Note: Impulse Response Functions to an unanticipated 25 basis point decrease in
the nominal interest rate. The horizontal axis reports quarters since the shock.
The vertical axis reports deviations from steady state.
therefore not rise as much.
Adjusting the survival rate down as suggested by the Bayesian estimation
decreases the magnitude of the response to shocks. In the original BGG model,
the mooted reaction is due to a larger share of new firms, which are not affected by
the shock. The inflow of new funding is not based on optimizing behavior by any
agents and happens regardless of the shock. This is different in the endogenous
firm entry model with an adjusted survival rate. Since the shock decreases the
profitability of of firms, fewer potential entrepreneurs will establish them.
TFP shocks for the case of endogenous firm entry are not substantially different
from the BGG case. After a positive TFP shock, production becomes more efficient
and the resulting price decrease stimulates demand. Capital investments become
more efficient and more investments into capital will be undertaken, increasing
the price of capital. All these result in a higher return to capital and a decrease in
the EFP, further stimulating investments. This is the case independently of the
survival rate
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Figure 3.2: TFP Shock
Note: Impulse Response Functions to an unanticipated one standard deviation
increase in TFP. The horizontal axis reports quarters since the shock. The vertical
axis reports deviations from steady state.
3.4.1 The External Finance Premium
The External Finance Premium (EFP) is the driving force of the Financial Accel-
erator. If the size of borrowers’ balance sheets move procyclically, BGG suggests
that the EFP should be counter-cyclical. The data are not clear on this issue.
De Graeve (2008) estimates a timeline for the EFP from a DSGE model using
post-WW2 US data that is generally increasing in times of growth and decreas-
ing after recessions. Martinez-Garcia (2013) finds a small but positive correlation
between output and the EFP, proxied by the spread between Baa-rated corporate
bond yields and the 20y Treasury bill rate. Gelain (2010) shows that the EFP for
an estimated model of the Euro area may have either cyclicality depending on the
type of shock.
As can be seen in the IRFs to TFP shocks, Figure 3.2, the EFP may react
cyclically to shocks if the survival rate γ becomes smaller. The reason is that
a smaller survival rate decreases aggregate net wealth more strongly, increasing
the leverage ratio and therefore the probability of default. However, shocks that
affect demand for goods positively will still increase investments, since new firms
entering the economy expect profits despite the heightened EFP. A low EFP may
then be the result of inefficient firms having left the market.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that firm entry in financial accelerator models can be made
endogenous and that the mechanism of the original BGG model still holds. Several
macroeconomic variables differ in the case of firm entry. First of all, aggregate net
worth is generally not affected as severely by shocks, since profit opportunities will
usually be scooped up by new entrants. This happens because potential entrants
will vary their efforts at establishing a firm with the business cycle.
In addition, the resulting model offers an interpretation of the equity premium
puzzle: Equity dividends offer a high yield, because not every equity issuer is a
good match for every household portfolio. Since searching for the right assets
takes time, and because there is a lack of demand for equities, matched equity
buyers and sellers enjoy a rent on their activities. In addition, the risk free rate is
below the discount rate in steady state because risk free assets offer a transactional
premium, as they can be used to buy other, higher yielding assets.
Following this interpretation, an estimation of the model with data commonly
used in the equity premium literature suggests a lower value for the fraction of
surviving entrepreneurs than the original BGG paper claims. This change in
the value affects the propagation of some shocks significantly. It may therefore
be advisable to use endogenous firm entry in other models, if parameters are
estimated or if household savings decisions are analyzed.
In the original BGG, firms exit the economy with a fixed probability every
period. It is a natural extension to incorporate endogenous firm exit into this
analysis.
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chapter 4
IMPLICATIONS OF SHADOW BANK REGULATION FOR
MONETARY POLICY AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND
Empirical evidence shows that monetary policy tightening affects three types of fi-
nancial institutions in different ways: banks decrease lending, while shadow banks
and investment funds increase lending. I develop an estimated monetary DSGE
model with funding market frictions that is able to replicate these empirical facts.
In a counterfactual exercise I study how the regulation of shadow banks affects an
economy at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Consumption volatility is reduced when
shadow bank assets are directly held by commercial banks. Alternatively, regulat-
ing shadow banks like investment funds results in a milder recession during, and
a quicker escape from, the ZLB. The reason is that a recessionary demand shock
that moves the economy to the ZLB has similar effects to a monetary tightening
due to the inability to reduce the policy rate below zero.
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4.1 Introduction
The financial sector has come under increasing scrutiny following the recent fi-
nancial crisis. With the regulatory community planning to especially constrain
the role of shadow banks1 in aggregate credit supply (Financial Stability Board,
2016; Claessens et al., 2012), the resulting excess credit demand will be met by
commercial banks and other non-bank financial institutions (NBFI). The relative
size of commercial banks in the financial sector matters for monetary policy trans-
mission, because bank lending is considered special (Brunnermeier et al., 2013;
Peek and Rosengren, 2013; Boivin et al., 2010). At the same time, monetary
policy makers have been faced with a reduced ability to lower policy rates due
to the zero lower bound (ZLB). This paper studies how different financial sector
configurations affect the behavior of an economy at the ZLB.
I take a standard monetary DSGE model and develop a financial sector with
commercial banks, shadow banks and investment funds2 that is able to replicate
empirical impulse response functions and key aggregate business cycle statistics
outside the ZLB. I implement a ZLB and conduct counterfactual analyses in which
shadow banks are eliminated from the model to mimic financial regulation. Since
the fundamentals of the real economy are not affected by the configuration of the
financial system, credit demand from the real sector stays constant and will either
be filled by commercial bank credit or investment fund credit. I argue that a
recession at the ZLB is milder and shorter lasting if the credit system relies more
on investment funds rather than on commercial banks.
The reason is as follows. Monetary tightening leads households to shift sav-
ings out of bank deposits and into higher yielding liabilities of investment funds,
which therefore increase lending. For commercial banks the reduction in resources
leads to a decrease in lending, which is called the bank lending channel. Because
the lower bound on monetary policy prevents the policy rate from falling to the
level that would be chosen with unconstrained monetary policy, the propagation
1Shadow banks have seen a reduction in credit intermediation by 50% since the financial crisis
(see Figure C.3 in Appendix C.3). I define shadow banks as ABS Issuers, Finance Companies,
Funding Corporations and Security Brokers and Dealers. Their fixed income private credit
intermediation, which is defined as loans, bonds, consumer credit and commercial paper, totaled
about 35% of all credit to the economy before the 2008 financial crisis. This group’s common
characteristic is that they occupy a central place in the internal functioning of financial markets
between other financial institutions. Households typically do not fund shadow banks directly.
2Investment funds are mutual funds and money market funds. Before the financial crisis
these institutions channeled about 25% of private credit to the real sector, and they have grown
since then. Unlike shadow banks, investment funds are directly accessible to households and
therefore feature in household savings decisions.
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mechanism of a ZLB-inducing demand shock resembles a monetary policy tighten-
ing: Households prefer higher yielding assets to deposits, which activates the bank
lending channel. This mechanism is weakened and credit reduction is dampened
during a downturn, if the financial sector is more reliant on non-deposit funding
provided by investment funds.
I contribute to the existing literature in three ways: i) by explaining and
replicating the empirical reactions of non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) to
monetary policy in a monetary DSGE model; ii) by likening the mechanism of
a ZLB-inducing demand shock to a response to monetary tightening; and iii) by
analyzing different financial sector configurations regarding their effectiveness to
escape the ZLB on nominal interest rates.
Including a distinct investment fund sector in the analysis requires some expla-
nation. I add them next to commercial banks and shadow banks for three reasons.
First, investment funds rely on equity funding, which is state contingent, while
commercial banks rely largely on deposit funding, which is non-state contingent.
Investment funds therefore represent the opposite to banks in terms of funding
and warrant a different type of model friction. Second, although investment fund
regulations are currently being tightened, regulatory authorities treat them as a
necessary part of the financial system, while the existence of shadow banks is
more challenged. Finally, the relevance of the structure of the financial system
is an important question in the literature (see e.g., Allen and Gale, 2001), which
I can explore in the context of my model. This discussion is crucial for regions
currently assessing different financial market structures. For example, in the Eu-
ropean Union the Capital Markets Union proposal suggests a move away from a
bank-dependent financial system to a more capital markets based system.
In Section 2, I conduct an empirical analysis of NBFI responses to monetary
policy shocks, which motivates the analysis. Next, I explore how a model with
three types of intermediaries and the incorporation of a savings decision by house-
holds can replicate and account for these empirical observations. Section 4 con-
tains the model analysis, including calibration and Bayesian estimation, impulse
response functions to monetary policy shocks and business cycle effects of elimi-
nating shadow banking. Section 5 contains the ZLB analysis and reaction of the
economy under different financial sector configurations, as well as the comparison
of a demand shock at the ZLB to a monetary tightening. Section 6 concludes.
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Related Literature
This paper mainly connects to four different strands of the literature. First, there
are a number of papers focusing on different aspects of shadow banking.3 I do
not look at crisis periods and the accompanying effects of fire sales, bankruptcy
and regime transition. Instead, I focus on business cycle consequences of different
financial system configurations after they have been implemented.
The second strand of the literature analyses the credit channel of monetary
policy. The credit channel posits that following monetary tightening the amount
of credit in an economy is reduced, which amplifies traditional interest rate and
asset price channels.4 This channel is split up in the balance sheet channel and
the bank lending channel.5 The latter has often been challenged in light of banks’
abilities to substitute to non-deposit funding.6 However, there is a large empirical
literature that finds evidence for the bank lending channel.7 This paper introduces
a mechanism that allows the financial sector to substitute into other sources of
funding and therefore decrease the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. A
related literature analyzes monetary policy effectiveness. Over the past several
decades unexpected monetary policy shocks appear to have had less and less of
an influence on the real economy.8 This is sometimes explained by developments
in capital and financial markets.9 This paper adds to the understanding of how
the financial market structure, especially its funding via savers, influences the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
Third, the paper adds to the understanding of economies that are constrained
3Meeks et al. (2014) analyze financial stability and consider shadow banks as off-balance sheet
vehicles of commercial banks to unload risky loans. Verona et al. (2013) study adverse effects
of excessively easy monetary policy and understand shadow banks as financial intermediaries
specializing in less risky loans akin to bond issuance by investment banks. Moreira and Savov
(2014) analyze the way in which shadow bank liability liquidity characteristics change over the
business cycle. Goodhart et al. (2012) study different regulatory regimes to stop fire sales by
shadow banks and take the opposite view to Verona et al., considering shadow banks to be
less risk averse, but still funded by the commercial banking sector, comparable to off-balance
sheet vehicles as in Meeks et al. Gertler et al. (2016) focus on the role of wholesale banking in
transmitting crises to the real sector.
4For a simple exposition in the IS/LM framework, see Bernanke and Blinder (1988).
5See Bernanke and Gertler (1995). The balance sheet channel is underlying the financial
accelerator as developed in Bernanke et al. (1999)
6Romer and Romer (1990) argue that bank loan supply is insulated from monetary policy if
banks can frictionlessly find non-depository funding.
7Early support from aggregate data comes from Kashyap et al. (1993). Identification issues,
however, necessitate more detailed data, which were advanced by Kashyap and Stein (1995).
8For an empirical exploration, see e.g., Primiceri (2005) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006).
For a structural explanation, see Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
9See Jermann and Quadrini (2006) and Dynan et al. (2006) as well as a critique by den Haan
and Sterk (2011).
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by a ZLB. Although the theoretical idea has existed for some time10, empirical
studies were limited to the Japanese experience. Since the financial crisis of 2008,
several studies have focused on how an economy can escape the ZLB via fiscal
policy or unconventional monetary policy.11 This paper instead focuses on how
the overall composition of the financial sector facilitates resilience to the negative
consequences of a ZLB.
Lastly, the theoretical mechanism developed in this paper is related to the
search and matching literature. The initial development focused on explaining
the dynamics of the labor market and replicating key statistics.12 It has since
found applications to other markets, including money and credit relationships.13
Following Wasmer and Weil (2004), I model funding market frictions analogously
to those on the labor market because of their comparable characteristics of ”moral
hazard, heterogeneity and specificity”. However, in my model the amount of
deposits changes endogenously.
4.2 Evidence on the reaction of financial
institutions to monetary policy shocks
This section summarizes the empirical reaction of lending by commercial banks,
shadow banks and investment funds to monetary tightening. I follow Christiano
et al. (1999) in the selection of variables and the identification of shocks by assum-
ing that the monetary policy makers choose their target for the federal funds rate
based on their information set Ωt. Variables contained in Ωt are contemporaneous
measures for GDP, the CPI and the index of sensitive commodity prices (com-
prising the first block of variables). The remaining variables are M2 money stock,
total central bank reserves, non-borrowed reserves and the amount of lending for
each intermediary (comprising the second block). Policymakers observe the sec-
ond set of variables only with a lag of one period. Since I am only interested in
the effects of monetary policy shocks, the ordering of variables within their blocks
does not matter. I use the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) as a proxy for monetary
policy.
10See Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for a theoretical treatment.
11Christiano et al. (2011) explain why the government spending multiplier at the ZLB can
generally be larger than 1, while Albertini and Poirier (2015) and Christiano et al. (2016) show
potentially expansionary effects of unemployment benefits. Gambacorta et al. (2014) explore
the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy.
12The seminal paper is Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
13See den Haan et al. (2003) and Wasmer and Weil (2004) for early contributions and Gu
et al. (2016) and Beaubrun-Diant and Tripier (2015) for current applications.
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I use quarterly data from 1984:1 to 2006:4. I exclude data after 2006, because
of the start of the global financial crisis, which changed the regulation and risk
perception of the financial sector, as well as the binding zero lower bound on
monetary policy (in 2008), which complicates the identification of monetary policy
shocks. The analysis starts in 1984, because of a likely structural break in the
conduct of monetary policy between the pre- and post-Volcker chairmanship of
the Federal Reserve, see Clarida et al. (2000).
For the purpose of this paper I define shadow banks as intermediaries that are
generally debt funded by other institutional investors and banks. They are ABS
Issuers, Security Brokers and Dealers, Finance Companies and Funding Corpora-
tions. Investment funds are open ended funds that issue and redeem equity fund
shares directly. Households can generally invest in them. Open ended funds are
Mutual Funds and Money Market Funds. Banks take deposits from households
and originate loans directly. They are U.S. Depository Institutions and Credit
Unions. Data for the financial sector variables are from the Financial Accounts
of the United States (see Table C.1 for details). I include loans, bonds, consumer
credit and commercial paper as a measure of credit. Intermediaries typically fund
substantial amounts of securities issued by the government and municipalities, as
well as debt backed by government-sponsored entities (GSEs). I purposely exclude
these items in the measure of real economy credit since securities with implicit or
explicit governmental guarantees are often assumed for liquidity reasons or used as
collateral and may therefore serve a different purpose than to profit from lending.
I use four lags to capture the dynamic properties of the quarterly dataset.
Because of the large number of parameters, I adopt an estimation approach with
Bayesian shrinkage of VAR parameters as in Banbura et al. (2010). The model
is estimated in log-levels (except for the FFR, which is in levels). All nominal
variables are transformed into real variables.14
Figure 4.1 shows the results of the structural analysis. Following a 100bp in-
crease in the FFR, lending by commercial banks initially stays constant, before it
drops by about 4% after three to four years. The lag in the reaction contrasts with
the literature that uses exact timing of FOMC announcements.15 This is poten-
tially due to the specific type of asset classes I focus on. Although banks reduce
lending for the general pool of loan applicants, informal lending relationships and
formal credit commitments require banks to support some clients with additional
14I explain the approach in more detail in Chapter 2, where I also conduct robustness exercises
regarding time horizon, as well as selection and ordering of variables.
15See, e.g., Francis et al. (2011).
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Figure 4.1: Responses of intermediaries to a contractionary monetary policy
shock. Note: Empirical impulse responses of the federal funds rate and credit by
commercial banks, investment funds and shadow banks to an unanticipated 100
basis point increase in the federal funds rate. The horizontal axis reports quarters
since the shock. The vertical axis reports percentage deviations from the unshocked
path. Shaded regions are 32nd-68th and 10th-90th percentiles of 1000 draws. The
full set of variable responses are in Figure C.4 in Appendix C.3. See Chapter 2
for additional information and sources.
funding (Morgan, 1998). On net, this might lead to little change in credit at first
before bank balance sheets give way to funding pressures. Investment fund lending
increases by more than 5% during the first year, before it falls back to the baseline
after two to three years. Lending by shadow banks increases by about 2% during
the first year. It slowly drops below baseline and bottoms out after five years.
The behavior of banks is in line with the credit channel of monetary policy:
because of an increase in funding costs for borrowers and their customers, prof-
its are reduced and collateral values drop. The increased riskiness of borrowers
translates into higher interest rates demanded by banks, which reduces credit de-
mand in line with the balance sheet channel (Bernanke et al., 1999). At the same
time, bank creditors substitute to higher yielding assets (Drechsler et al., 2016),
which reduces the amount of resources available to banks, which corresponds to
the bank lending channel. The behavior of shadow banks is often explained via
regulatory arbitrage: because commercial banks face binding leverage and capital
restrictions, they channel resources via less strictly regulated shadow banks that
they own and control. Money market funds pass on higher returns to investors
more quickly than banks do on their deposits and therefore receive an inflow in
funding, which is passed on as additional lending (see Chapter 2).
There are several studies that find complementary evidence. Nelson et al.
(2015) conduct a similar analysis, but differ in regards to the definition of shadow
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banks and asset classes.16 Their estimation in log differences finds commercial
bank asset growth dropping after monetary tightening, while shadow bank asset
growth increases. In a Factor-Augmented VAR, Igan et al. (2013) study the ef-
fects of monetary policy on intermediary balance sheets from 1990:1 to 2008:2.
They similarly find that money market funds (a type of investment fund) in-
crease assets after monetary tightening. Security brokers and dealers (a type of
shadow bank) also increase assets. Pescatori and Sole (2016) estimate a VAR with
banks, ABS issuers and finance companies, but also include government sponsored
entities (GSEs), agency and GSE-backed mortgage pools and life insurance com-
panies. The authors conclude that monetary tightening decreases aggregate credit
intermediation, but increases the relative sizes of non-banks, thereby potentially
increasing systemic risk by pushing credit intermediation to less regulated sectors.
den Haan and Sterk (2011) estimate the response of mortgage and consumer credit
held by banks and non-banks. Bank mortgages and consumer credit decline or
stay relatively flat, respectively, after monetary policy tightening, while non-bank
holdings increase.
Next, I explore how a monetary DSGE model with financial frictions can repli-
cate and explain the empirical results.
4.3 A monetary DSGE model with three types
of financial institutions
Although the financial sector has been incorporated into DSGE models recently,
it is still largely treated as a relatively homogeneous entity. I follow the call by
Woodford (2010) for ”a framework for macroeconomic analysis in which intermedi-
ation plays a crucial role and [...] which also takes account of the fact that the U.S.
financial sector is now largely market-based.” I employ a monetary DSGE model
with sluggish price setting to generate nominal frictions, which allows shocks to
the nominal monetary policy rate to affect real variables.
The structure of the shadow banking sector and its relationship to the rest of
the financial sector is comparable to Meeks et al. (2014) and Gertler et al. (2016).
Debt and equity financing are modeled using two different types of frictions. Debt
16They look at the change in the total size of the balance sheets instead of a single asset
class (fixed income holdings with the real sector as in this paper). This is an imperfect measure
when one is interested in the effectiveness of the credit channel, as financial intermediaries are
invested in equity as well as governmental and municipal debt, which are often held for collateral
purposes.
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financing via the moral hazard problem as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and
Gertler and Karadi (2011) guarantees that as long as the intermediary does not
exceed a maximum amount of leverage per intermediary value, creditors are in-
different towards the absolute amount of debt that they hold. This introduces
endogenously varying leverage in to the model. Without explicitly modeling it,
this can be understood as deposit insurance for commercial banks and pledged, or
asset backed, debt for shadow banks.
Equity financing is risky. Since equity investors participate in the state-
contingent returns of the intermediary, households are only willing to hold equity
claims that have an underlying returns profile that fits into the individual house-
hold’s portfolio. An equity return that is higher than the interest rate on debt
captures this riskiness. Although not modeled explicitly, this heterogeneity on
the micro level is captured via a search and matching mechanism: only a fraction
of households agree to the terms of the potential intermediaries that they meet
on the equity funding market. This friction introduces an endogenously varying
value for fund shares, while keeping households from investing all of their savings
in higher yielding assets. Households therefore change the amount of available
savings for investment purposes depending on the state of the business cycle. In
addition, this friction allows me to solve the savings decision of households via a
linear approximation.
SaversIntermediariesBorrowers
Households
Deposits
Fund 
Shares
Commercial Banks
Loans Deposits
CP Net Worth
Investment Funds
CP Fund 
SharesLoans
Goods Producers
Physical 
Capital
Loans 
(Banks)
Loans 
(Shadow 
Banks)
Loans 
(Funds)
Shadow Banks
Loans
CP
CP
Net Worth
Figure 4.2: Balance sheets of key agents in the economy. Note: In addition,
the economy is populated by capital producers and monopolistically competitive
retailers. A central bank is the source of monetary disturbances. CP = Commercial
Paper.
In addition to the five agents shown in Figure 4.2, the economy is populated
by capital producers and monopolistically competitive retailers. A central bank
conducting monetary policy is the source of monetary disturbances and completes
the model.
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4.3.1 Households
A continuum of households of measure one exists that consume, save in a portfolio
of assets and supply labor. They maximize discounted lifetime utility
max
{Ct,Lt,Dt,NIFt }∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
i=0
βi
)[
ln(Ct − hCt−1)− χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt
]
subject to the sequence of period budget constraints
Ct +D
e
t +N
IF
t = WtLt + Πt +RtD
e
t−1 +R
IF
t N
IF
t−1.
The household is modeled as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) (GK11 from here
on) with two additions: a time varying discount factor βt and shares in investment
funds N IFt as a savings alternative to deposits D
e
t . An increase in the discount
factor results in the reduction of current consumption Ct and a subsequent drop
in output demand and inflation, which lead to a reduction in the monetary policy
rate, possibly reaching the ZLB. Each unit of labor Lt earns the real wage Wt. Πt
are profits from ownership of capital producers, retailers and financial intermedi-
aries. The habit parameter is h, χ is the relative utility weight of labor and ϕ is
the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Household can save in deposits at commercial banks, Det , and shares in invest-
ment funds, N IFt . I include fund shares to allow households to substitute towards
higher yielding assets in response to monetary tightening. On the micro level,
when a household wants to invest into shares, it enters the funding market with
liquid assets Dt and randomly meets a potential investment fund. If the invest-
ment fund is a good fit regarding individual portfolio characteristics, they invest
and form a match. On the macro level, this behavior is approximated by a search
and matching mechanism: we only observe a fraction ft of household savings Dt
establish a match. The remaining savings are deposited in banks, with end-of-
period deposits Det = Dt(1 − ft). The fraction ft is endogenously determined as
explained in Section 4.3.2. Investment funds pay a state-contingent interest rate
RIFt , which is above the risk-less real return Rt that banks pay on deposits. A
fraction θIF of households withdraws their existing fund investments every period,
resulting in a law of motion for fund shareholdings:
N IFt = θIFN
IF
t−1ξ
IF
t + ftDt. (4.1)
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Reinvested fund shares might be affected by ξIFt , an autoregressive shock pro-
cess of order one and unit mean. With %t denoting marginal utility of consumption
and µt denoting the additional value of being invested in fund shares, the first order
conditions are given by
Consumption Ct : %t =
1
Ct − hCt−1 − Et
βt+1h
Ct+1 − hCt . (4.2)
Labor Lt : χL
ϕ
t = %tWt. (4.3)
Deposits Dt : %t = (1− ft)Etβt+1Rt+1%t+1 + ft(µt + %t). (4.4)
Fund Shares N IFt : µt + %t = Etβt+1
{
RIFt+1%t+1 + µt+1θIF ξ
IF
t+1
}
. (4.5)
The first order conditions for consumption and labor are standard. Equation
(4.4) reduces to the commonly known Euler condition in the case that fund in-
vestments do not exist or have no additional value17, i.e., the household increases
savings until the marginal utility of consumption today equals the discounted ex-
pected marginal utility of consumption tomorrow. If households can invest in fund
shares, but their ability to find a match is constrained (i.e., ft < 1), being invested
in an investment fund is valuable (i.e., µt > 0). The household therefore increases
savings until the marginal utility of consumption today equals the probability of
consuming tomorrow (1 − ft) times its value (the discounted expected marginal
utility of consumption tomorrow) plus the probability of investing in fund shares
ft times that value.
The value of investing in fund shares is given by Equation (4.5). The right-hand
side can be rewritten to yield Etβt+1
{
rIFt+1%t+1 + (1− θIF )%t+1 + θIF (%t+1 + µt+1)
}
.
The first term denotes the per period net return rIFt+1 from fund share investments
that every investing household receives. The second term is the fraction of house-
holds that redeem their fund shares and use them for current period consumption.
A fraction θIF of households stays invested in fund shares and will reap the value
of being invested one period hence, expressed in the last term.
4.3.2 Financial intermediaries
There are three types of intermediaries: commercial banks, investment funds and
shadow banks. Commercial banks finance the real sector directly via loans and
buy shadow bank commercial paper. Investment funds finance loans to the real
sector and commercial paper in shadow banks via fund shares, which they sell to
17Iff µt = 0, Equation (4.4) holds for all ft.
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households. They are not able to leverage their operations with debt. Shadow
banks use their funding to extend loans to the real sector.
Commercial banks
There are infinitely many commercial banks in the economy, which are operated
by members of households. Each commercial bank can make loans SCBt to the real
sector that mature in one period and yield a return RKt+1, as in GK11. Following
Meeks et al. (2014), every commercial bank can also extend credit to the shadow
banking sector, which is called commercial paper. Commercial paper MCBt is
different from regular loans, because it denotes a claim on a pool of loans man-
aged by the shadow bank and yields a return RMCBt+1 . The commercial bank funds
these claims via net worth NCBt and deposits Dt that it receives from other house-
holds (excluding the household that it is managed by). The balance sheet of a
commercial bank is then
QtS
CB
t +M
CB
t = N
CB
t +Dt (4.6)
where Qt denotes the price of physical capital. The commercial bank accumulates
earnings net of the interest Rt that it pays out to depositors one period hence:
NCBt = R
K
t+1QtS
CB
t +R
MCB
t+1 M
CB
t −Rt+1Dt. (4.7)
Each commercial bank has a finite life time and exits the market with a proba-
bility θCB each period. Once the commercial bank exits, it pays out accumulated
lifetime earnings to the household whose member was its manager. The commer-
cial bank therefore maximizes its expected terminal net worth V CBt by picking its
loan portfolio and funding according to
V CBt = max{SCBt ,MCBt ,Dt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
τ=0
(
τ∏
i=0
βi
)
(1− θCB)θτCBΛt,t+τNCBt+τ , (4.8)
where the stochastic discount factor of the household is given by the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption today and tomorrow Λt,t+1 and the
discount factor βt. Since deposits only pay the risk free rate, a commercial bank
has an incentive to keep leveraging up as long as it earns more than Rt on its credit
claims. To motivate leverage endogenously, I introduce the incentive constraint
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by GK11: Every period, a commercial bank can divert a fraction λCB of its credit
claims, which leads to the termination of the commercial bank. Since in such
a case depositors would lose their claims on the commercial bank, they force the
commercial bank to limit its leverage in such a way that motivates the commercial
bank to continue operations. A commercial bank is required to always maintain
a value from continuing operations that is at least as high as the value it would
gain from defaulting:
V CBt ≥ λCB[QtSCBt + (1− λABS)MCBt ]. (4.9)
A commercial bank can divert a larger fraction of its real sector loans, which
are non-standardized, than of the commercial paper. Because commercial paper
is a claim on a broad pool of loans, its standardization makes it more pledgeable.
This is captured in the factor (1 − λABS). As λABS approaches 1, a commercial
bank can reduce its funding constraint by shifting from outright lending to com-
mercial paper, thereby evading leverage restrictions. This captures the regulatory
arbitrage motive of off-balance sheet vehicles.
The solution to the commercial bank’s problem is derived in Appendix C.1.1
and yields the balance sheet relation
QtS
CB
t +M
CB
t (1− λABS) = NCBt φCBt (4.10)
with endogenous leverage φCBt .
Since a constant fraction θCB of commercial banks exit each period, the re-
maining commercial banks have a net worth of
NCBet = θCB(R
K
t Qt−1S
CB
t−1 +R
MCB
t M
CB
t−1 −RtDt−1). (4.11)
To make up for the outflow, households establish new commercial banks ac-
cording to
NCBnt = ω
CB(QtS
CB
t−1 +M
CB
t−1) (4.12)
with ωCB calibrated to pin down the steady state. The law of motion for com-
mercial bank net worth is the combination of both existing and new net worth
NCBt = N
CB
et ξ
CB
t +N
CB
nt . Existing commercial bank net worth may be affected by
ξCBt , an autoregressive shock process of order one and unit mean.
57
4.3. A model with three types of financial institutions
Investment funds
In addition to commercial bank deposits, households may save in fund shares,
which is a novel mechanism that I introduce into the GK11 framework. Fund
shares offer higher returns on average in order to attract investments, but are
state-contingent, since they are equity instruments. Infinitely many investment
funds offer fund shares that differ on the micro level with regards to characteristics
like investment style and fund management. Similarly, individual household pref-
erences differ on the micro level with regard to the profile of an investment fund
and individual portfolio preferences. Because of these idiosyncratic differences,
households need to find a suitable fund, which takes time. Individual households
and investment funds meet on the funding market at random and evaluate the
potential for a match in isolation. I abstract from the mechanics on the micro
level and approximate the behavior on the macro level via search and matching:
in aggregate a fraction qt of all investment funds searching for funding will find
an investing household. In order to participate in the funding market, investment
funds need to advertise their operations at a cost κ per advertisement vt. After
forming a match, an investment fund is able to invest into either loans to the real
sector SIFt or the commercial paper of shadow banks M
IF
t .
In contrast to commercial banks, investment funds do not face the same in-
centive constraint problem, since they do not leverage their operations with debt
or deposits. They lend out all acquired funding either to shadow banks or to the
real economy. Given their funding, they maximize returns subject to constraints
that prohibit them from investing more than a share ψIF of assets into commer-
cial paper. Since commercial paper from shadow banks pays a higher return than
loans to the real sector (see Equation (4.23)), investment funds generally invest
into commercial paper up to their constraint ψIF .
Each period, investment funds pay out a return RIFt to their investing house-
hold. Some households will want to withdraw funding for consumption or alter-
native savings, while a fraction θIF keeps their existing fund shares. The value of
an investment fund that has formed a match is
V IF,Mt = −RIFt + ψIFRMIFt + (1− ψIF )RKt + θIFEtβt+1Λt,t+1V IF,Mt+1 , (4.13)
where RMIFt is the return on commercial paper holdings of investment funds.
Investment funds searching for funding have a value
V IF,St = −κ+ qtEtβt+1Λt,t+1V IF,Mt+1 . (4.14)
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Since operating an established investment fund is profitable, the value of oper-
ating an investment fund searching for funding may generally be profitable if the
second term in Equation (4.14) is larger than the search cost κ. Additional poten-
tial investment funds searching for funding will therefore enter the funding market,
which depresses the average fund filling rate qt, until the value of a searching in-
vestment fund is zero. A Euler condition for the number of fund advertisements
can be derived:
κ
qt
= Etβt+1Λt,t+1
{
−RIFt + ψIFRMIFt + (1− ψIF )RKt +
κ
qt+1
θIF
}
. (4.15)
New fund advertisements are posted until the cost of establishing an investment
fund is equal to the return, which consists of the difference in interest income and
expenses, as well as the value from not having to look for funding in the next
period. The probability of finding a match is the number of realized matches mt
per advertisement18,
qt =
mt
vt
. (4.16)
The number of matches is determined by the number of fund advertisements
as well as the amounts households want to save. Since investment funds offer a
higher return than deposits pay, households always prefer to hold fund shares.19
The number of matches therefore rises with the amount of household deposits and
is determined via a Cobb-Douglas matching function
mt = sD
ξ
t v
1−ξ
t (4.17)
with matching efficiency s and matching elasticity ξ.
Shadow banks
Shadow banks are financial intermediaries that channel funding from commercial
banks and investment funds to the real sector. Commercial banks invest into
shadow banks via commercial paper MCBt , which is standardized and therefore
more pledgeable to the commercial bank creditors. Investment funds invest into
the commercial paper of shadow banks M IFt because they offer a high return.
Accumulated earnings in net worth NSBt retain the ’first loss’ of securitized assets.
18The rate at which households find a suitable investment is the investment finding rate
ft = mt/Dt.
19The investment fund return is solved via Nash Bargaining and is derived in Appendix C.1.3.
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The amount of real sector lending SSBt is
QtS
SB
t = M
CB
t +M
IF
t +N
SB
t . (4.18)
Since they are leveraged, shadow banks maximize terminal expected net worth
by choosing lending and funding sources according to
V SBt = max{SSBt ,MCBt ,MIFt }∞t=0
E0
∞∑
τ=0
(
τ∏
i=0
βi
)
(1− θSB)θτSBΛt,t+τNSBt+τ . (4.19)
Retained earningsNSBt+1 in a shadow bank are made up of the interest rate difference
that they make on loans and what they pay on commercial paper by commercial
banks and investment funds:
NSBt = R
K
t QtS
SB
t −RMIFt M IFt −RMCBt MCBt . (4.20)
As in Meeks et al. (2014), shadow banks structure some of their liabilities to
be extra safe, i.e., they pool their loans and attribute the safest returns to certain
creditors. These creditors are commercial banks, which need pledgeable securities
to circumvent their regulatory capital constraints. Only a fraction ψCB of all loans
that shadow banks grant meet this standard. The amount of loans that can be
financed via commercial paper held by commercial banks is therefore
MCBt ≤ ψCBQtSSBt . (4.21)
The solution to the shadow banks’ problem is derived in Appendix C.1.2 and
yields the balance sheet relation
QtS
SB
t =
NSBt +M
IF
t
1− ψCB . (4.22)
Since some loans remain unsecuritized and non-pledgeable, a portion of the
shadow bank balance sheets cannot be funded by commercial bank holdings of
commercial paper. Demand by investment funds for commercial paper therefore
increases the lending operations of shadow banks. In order to incentivize invest-
ment funds to hold commercial paper rather than grant loans themselves, shadow
banks share the profit they receive from additional lending via Nash bargaining
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according to
RMIFt = R
K
t + ζ
IF ψ
CB
1− ψCB (R
K
t −RMCBt ), (4.23)
where ζIF is the bargaining power of the investment fund. Just like commercial
banks and investment funds, a constant fraction θSB of shadow banks exit each
period. The remaining shadow banks have a net worth of
NSBet = θSB(R
K
t QtS
SB
t −RMIFt M IFt −RMCBt MCBt ). (4.24)
To make up for the outflow, new shadow banks are established according to
NSBnt = ω
SBQtS
SB
t−1 (4.25)
with ωSB calibrated to pin down the steady state. The law of motion for shadow
bank net worth is the combination of both existing and new net worth NSBt =
NSBet ξ
SB
t + N
SB
nt . Existing shadow bank net worth may be affected by ξ
SB
t , an
autoregressive shock process of order one and unit mean.
4.3.3 Goods producers
The intermediaries are not productive by themselves and only derive profits from
the return on loans to goods producers. Perfectly competitive goods producers
manufacture intermediate goods and sell them to retailers at the relative interme-
diate output price Pmt. After production, non-depreciated capital is sold to capital
producers and refurbished. Labor and capital for past production are remunerated
and decisions for new production are taken: The firm maximizes profits by solving
max
{Kt+1,Lt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
τ=0
(
τ∏
i=0
βi
)
Λt,t+τ
[
PmτYτ + (Qτ − δ)ξKτ Kτ −WτLτ −RkτKτQτ−1
]
with production output given by
Yt = At(ξ
K
t Kt)
αL1−αt (4.26)
where α is the capital share, Qt is the real price of capital, δ is the depreciation
rate, Wt are wages, At is a total factor productivity shock and ξ
K
t is a capital
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quality shock. The first-order conditions are
RKt Qt = Pmtα
Yt
Kt
+ (Qt − δ)ξKt (4.27)
Pmt(1− α)Yt
Lt
= Wt. (4.28)
Firms pay out ex post returns to capital as interest payments, resulting in
no profits state by state. Since they pay the same interest rate RKt to all credi-
tors, loans by different intermediaries are perfect substitutes and do not enter the
maximization problem of the firm:
Kt+1 = S
CB
t + S
IF
t + S
SB
t . (4.29)
4.3.4 Capital producers and retailers
Following GK11, capital producers buy leftover capital from goods producers
which they refurbish, for which the price is unity. Units of new capital are made
using input of final output and are then sold to goods producers at Qt, which
capital producers set by solving
max
Int
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tt Λt,τ
{
(Qτ − 1)Inτ − f
(
Inτ + ISS
Inτ−1 + ISS
)
(Inτ + ISS)
}
with
Int ≡ Itιt − δξtKt. (4.30)
Following the literature on the importance of marginal efficiency of investment
(Justiniano et al., 2010), investment specific shocks ιt affect the transformation of
gross investment into net investment. The functional form of f(.) obeys f(1) =
f ′(1) = 0 and f ′′(1) > 0. f(.) determines capital adjustment costs with the steady
state value for investments given by ISS. The capital producer thus creates profits
outside of the steady state. Households receive profits from sales of new capital
at price Qt, which is given by the first-order condition
Qt = 1 + f(.) +
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
f ′(.)− EtβtΛt,t+1
(
Int+1 + ISS
Int + ISS
)2
f ′(.). (4.31)
Retailers buy intermediate goods from goods producers at the relative inter-
mediate output price Pmt. Final output is the CES composite of a continuum of
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output by each retailer f with the elasticity of substitution , given by
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
−1

ft df
] 
−1
.
Because users of final output minimize costs, we get
Yft =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−
Yt
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ft df
] 1
1−
.
Each retailer can reset prices with probability 1−γ each period. Retailers will
otherwise index their prices to lagged inflation. The retailers then choose their
reset price P ∗t optimally to solve
max
P ∗t
Et
∞∑
i=0
γiβitΛt,t+1
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(1 + pit+k−1)γp − Pmt+i
]
Yft+i.
The first-order condition is given by
Et
∞∑
i=0
γiβitΛt,t+1
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(1 + pit+k−1)γp − 
− 1Pmt+i
]
Yft+i = 0. (4.32)
The evolution of the price level is given by
Pt = [(1− γ)(P ∗t )1− + γ(Πγpt−1Pt−1)1−]1/(1−). (4.33)
4.3.5 Market clearing, resources and policy
The aggregate resource constraint is given by consumption, investment and ad-
justment costs
Yt = Ct + It + f
(
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
)
(Int + ISS). (4.34)
Capital evolves according to
Kt+1 = ξ
K
t Kt + Int, (4.35)
i.e., an autoregressive capital quality shock ξKt of order one captures the variabil-
ity of capital productivity inherent in fixed capital. Following the literature on
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the importance of marginal efficiency of investment (Justiniano et al., 2010), in-
vestment specific shocks ιt affect the transformation of gross investment into net
investment. Gross investment Int is
Int ≡ Itιt − δξtKt. (4.36)
Monetary policy is characterized by a Taylor rule. The nominal interest rate is
given by it, with a steady state interest rate of iSS, the steady state value of output
given by YSS, an interest rate smoothing parameter ρi, the inflation coefficient κpi
and the output gap coefficient κy:
it = i
ρi
t−1
[
iSS(pit)
κpi
(
Yt
YSS
)κy]1−ρi
t (4.37)
The exogenous shock to monetary policy enters the nominal interest rate as
t. The nominal interest rate has an effect on the economy through the Fisher
relation
1 + it = Rt+1Et(1 + pit+1), (4.38)
where Etpit+1 is expected future net inflation.
4.4 Model specification and analysis
In this section, I first pin down the model parameterization via calibration and
Bayesian estimation. Because I want to assess the model’s ability to replicate
business cycle statistics, I use a Bayesian estimation instead of minimizing the
distance between empirical and theoretical IRFs as in Christiano et al. (2005).
Distance minimization would be possible if empirical IRFs by the different inter-
mediaries for other key macroeconomic disturbances were available. A Bayesian
estimation allows a complementary analysis and can be understood as a cross val-
idation for my empirical results: the model IRFs to monetary disturbances from
the estimated parameters are comparable to the empirical IRFs in Chapter 2.
Next, I analyze how monetary policy shocks propagate through the economy
for four different compositions of the financial system. Since only the financial
sector is reconfigured, but fundamentals of the model economy are unaffected,
real sector credit demand in steady state is unchanged. The baseline case is the
financial system with commercial banks, shadow banks and investment funds,
corresponding to the situation before the financial crisis of 2008. Since then,
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shadow bank lending has declined and been replaced by commercial bank and
investment fund lending, which is attributable to consolidation in the industry
and new regulations. To show the effects of different financial sector compositions,
I consider three cases, one in which shadow bank lending has been taken up by
commercial banks, an alternative in which investment funds have taken up the
credit demand, and one in which both sectors share previously intermediated credit
by shadow banks. The different relative sizes of commercial banks to investment
funds are due to changes in parameter values. The affected parameter values are
the proportional transfer to the entering bankers ωCB, the proportional transfer to
the entering shadow bankers ωSB, the fund’s survival rate θIF , the fund advertising
cost κ, and the household bargaining power w.r.t. funds ζHH . The model is solved
via first order perturbation around the deterministic steady state.
4.4.1 Parameterization
Several newly introduced parameters are calibrated to pre-crisis steady state values
or directly follow from their economic counterparts. Parameters that govern the
stochastic process as well as those that are not pinned down by steady state values
and that do not have a direct economic counterpart are estimated. Most of the
structural parameters present in GK11 are adopted here.
The pre-crisis economy includes a fully active shadow banking sector with a
share of lending of approximately 35%, while commercial banks lent 40%, and
investment funds lent the remaining 25% of credit.
The risk-free rate as measured by Shiller (1992) with updated values from his
website is 3 percentage points per year. This translates into a quarterly risk-free
rate of 75 basis points, i.e., iSS = .0075 assuming zero inflation in steady state.
In models featuring a conventional Euler equation this implies a higher discount
factor than β = 0.99, which is used in this calibration. However, note that if the
additional value from being invested in investment funds, µt, is positive, and if
search frictions guarantee that the finding rate ft ∈ (0, 1), then over-saving will
result in a risk-free rate that is lower than β−1.
The fraction of commercial bank assets invested in commercial paper by shadow
banks is set at 30%, as indicated in bank call report data reported in Meeks et al.
(2014). The corresponding fraction for investment fund assets is 40% pre-crisis as
indicated by Flows of Funds data.
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Symbol Value Description Source
Households
β 0.99 Steady state discount rate Gertler and Karadi (2011)
h 0.815 Habit parameter Gertler and Karadi (2011)
χ 3.409 Relative utility weight of labor Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ϕ 0.276 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Financial Sectors
iSS 0.0075 Quarterly nominal rate Shiller (1992)
ψCB 0.3 Fraction of commercial bank assets invested in commercial paper Meeks et al. (2014)
ψIF 0.4 Fraction of investment fund assets invested in commercial paper Flows of Funds
λABS 1 Relative divertibility of ABS Steady state
ζIF 0.88 Fund bargaining power re shadow banks Steady state
ζHH 0.86 Household bargaining power w.r.t. funds Steady state
ωCB 0.15 Proportional transfer to the entering bankers Steady state
ωSB 0.04 Proportional transfer to the entering shadow bankers Steady state
s .32 Matching efficiency Steady state
κ .0007 Search cost Steady state
Goods Producers
α 0.33 Effective capital share Gertler and Karadi (2011)
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Retail Firms
 4.167 Elasticity of substitution Gertler and Karadi (2011)
γ 0.779 Probability of keeping prices fixed Gertler and Karadi (2011)
γp 0.241 Price indexation Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Government
κpi 1.5 Inflation coefficient of Taylor rule Gertler and Karadi (2011)
κy 0.125 Output gap coefficient of Taylor rule Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Table 4.1: Calibrated parameter values. Note: ’steady state’ refers to parameter
values that directly follow from assumed steady state values. The steady state val-
ues are either the relative share of the financial sector or interest rate differentials.
Remaining model parameters are chosen to imply a spread for the borrowing
rate Rk − Rt of 79 bp, equal to the bank prime loan rate spread over the 3-
month Treasury Bill rate between 2001 and 2004. A spread of 109 bp as proxied
by Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield is chosen for the commercial
paper rate that shadow banks pay to investment funds. I assume that shadow
banks belong to commercial banks and therefore do not pay a higher interest rate
RMCBt than Rt. This results in commercial paper held by commercial banks to
be pledgable with a λABS = 1, i.e., commercial banks cannot divert these assets.
It follows from the steady state and parameter values that the bargaining power
of investment funds vis-a-vis shadow banks ζIF is then .88, since shadow banks
need a buyer of remaining loan pools. The fraction of new equity that has to be
injected into commercial bank and shadow bank equity, respectively, is ωCB = .15
and ωSB = .04. The matching efficiency s, search costs κ and household bargaining
power ζHH follows from the steady state and parameter values. Table 4.1 shows
the fixed structural parameter values and their source.
The remaining parameters, including those governing the shock processes, are
estimated using Bayesian methods. Commercial banks, investment funds and
shadow banks are defined as in Chapter 2: Commercial banks are US Depository
Institutions and Credit Unions. Shadow banks are ABS Issuers, Security Brokers
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Prior Posterior
Symbol Name Type Mean Std. Dev. Mean L.B. U.B.
Structural
ξ Matching elasticity Beta 0.5 0.2 0.74 0.66 0.84
λCB Commercial bank’s divertible share Beta 0.381 0.05 0.48 0.46 0.49
θCB Commercial bank’s survival rate Beta 0.75 0.05 0.63 0.57 0.68
θIF Investment fund’s survival rate Beta 0.75 0.05 0.74 0.68 0.80
θSB Shadow banker’s survival rate Beta 0.75 0.05 0.74 0.66 0.84
Persistence parameters
ρA TFP Beta 0.5 0.2 0.68 0.54 0.85
ρi Monetary Policy Beta 0.5 0.2 0.61 0.55 0.68
ρξ Capital Quality Beta 0.5 0.2 0.19 0.09 0.30
ρIS Investment Efficiency Beta 0.5 0.2 0.993 0.990 .998
ρβ Demand Beta 0.5 0.2 0.84 0.77 0.90
ρCB Commercial bank equity Beta 0.5 0.2 0.25 0.11 0.37
ρIF Investment fund equity Beta 0.5 0.2 0.74 0.68 0.80
ρSB Shadow bank equity Beta 0.5 0.2 0.78 0.71 0.84
Std dev.
eA TFP Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.012 0.007 0.017
ei Monetary Policy Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.003 0.002 0.004
eξ Capital Quality Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.012 0.011 0.014
eIS Investment Efficiency Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.013 0.011 0.015
eβ Demand Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.004 0.003 0.006
eCB Commercial bank equity Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.043 0.036 0.048
eIF Investment fund equity Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.054 0.040 0.067
eSB Shadow bank equity Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.200 0.166 0.226
Table 4.2: Priors and posteriors of estimated parameters. Note: L.B. is the lower
bound of the 90% highest posterior density interval. U.B. is the upper bound of
the 90% highest posterior density interval.
and Dealers, Finance Companies and Funding Corporations. Investment funds are
Mutual Funds and Money Market Funds. As a measure of credit I include loans,
bonds, consumer credit and commercial paper. The macroeconomic time series
underlying the data for observables are: real GDP, the consumer price index, the
federal funds rate, fixed capital, household consumption, and credit by commercial
banks, investment funds and shadow banks (see Table C.1 in Appendix C.3 for
details on the data sources). Since the model is expressed in log-deviations from
steady state, for estimation purposes I take the log difference from the one-sided
HP filtered trend (smoothing parameter is set to 1600) for all variables except
inflation and the federal funds rate, which are depicted in Figure C.6 in Appendix
C.3.3. The data have a quarterly frequency and range from 1984:I to 2006:IV.
The priors for all persistence parameters are relatively uninformative Beta dis-
tributions with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2. The priors for the
white noise processes on the innovations are Inverse Gamma distributions with
means 0.01 standard deviations of 0.05. The shock processes are a priori indepen-
dent. The prior distributions for the structural parameters are beta distributions.
The interval for the matching elasticity allows all parameters between 0 and 1.
The commercial bank’s divertible share λCB is centered on the GK11 value of
0.381 and bound from below and bound from above to limit commercial bank
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leverage. The intervals for survival rates are between (0.5, 1.0).
I run 2 Monte Carlo Markov Chains with 100.000 draws each over the full
sample period. Convergence is reached after about 20.000 draws and I drop the
first 50% of estimated values. Table 4.2 shows the results. The posteriors of the
shock processes are informative (see Appendix C.3.3). In order to illuminate the
dynamics of the matching friction, I conduct a robustness analysis of the matching
elasticity ξ in Appendix C.2.
4.4.2 Response to a monetary policy shock
Figure 4.3 shows impulse response functions for key variables after unexpected
monetary policy tightening for the case of i) the original GK11 economy, and ii)
the baseline case with investment funds and shadow banks. Two additional cases
describe what happens after elimination of the shadow banking system. In the
case of iii) the loans previously held by shadow banks are now intermediated by
commercial banks (bank dependent), and iv) the shadow bank loans are intermedi-
ated by funds (fund dependent). The third case corresponds to commercial banks
granting 75% of all loans to the real economy, while the last case has commercial
banks intermediating a total of 40% of credit. Investment funds intermediate the
remaining share in the latter two cases.
First, consider the original GK11 economy. After an unexpected monetary
tightening of about 100 basis points in the first period, interest rates on com-
mercial bank deposits increase to encourage depositors to keep their savings with
commercial banks instead of shifting them into other assets. Because households
have a higher incentive to save, consumption drops. The reduction in consumption
demand translates into lower output and a reduction in the demand for physical
capital by firms, which also lowers the price for physical capital. Lower output and
capital prices initially diminish the return on capital for the firm, see Equation
(4.27). Since firms pass this return on as the borrowing cost to the intermediary,
existing commercial bank profits are hit. In the second period, the borrowing rate
increases, because the price for physical capital slowly rises from its initial low.
Since the risk-free rate does not increase by as much as the borrowing rate, the ex-
ternal finance premium (EFP) rises. Equation (C.1.2) increases as the EFP rises,
indicating gains from expanding assets for commercial banks. This means that
the reduction in lending is not just due to the balance sheet channel, which would
necessitate a drop in credit demand. Banks are unable to quickly raise equity and
soliciting more deposits from households would cut into their margin. Credit to
68
Chapter 4. Shadow Bank Regulation at the Zero Lower Bound
the real sector therefore drops.
The baseline case features shadow banks and investment funds. After a mon-
etary policy increase, the initial reaction in the economy is the same. However,
commercial banks now have the ability to leverage up on their existing net wealth
by increasing their investments into shadow banks, which lend on their behalf.
At the same time, commercial banks face competition from investment funds,
which increase the fund rate more aggressively than commercial banks increase
the deposit rate. Households therefore substitute away from commercial bank
deposits and into investment fund shares, which is consistent with empirical find-
ings (Drechsler et al., 2016). Since many previously creditworthy borrowers were
pushed out of the market, investment fund and shadow bank loans now replace
some of the lost commercial bank credit. The bank lending channel is therefore
reduced, because the financial sector substitutes away from bank deposits and into
other funding options. This has a dampening effect on the fall in physical capi-
tal, which is reduced two thirds less compared to the GK11 economy with only
commercial banks. The effect of the mitigated credit crunch is a less pronounced
recession.
If the credit previously intermediated by shadow banks is now granted by
commercial banks (the ’bank dependent’ scenario), there is no room for outright
regulatory capital arbitrage by commercial banks anymore. Commercial banks
therefore cut back on credit after monetary policy tightening, opening up the
possibility for investment funds to fill the excess credit demand. Investment funds
do so by raising funding from households. Although investment funds increase
lending by more than 3%, the decrease in commercial bank borrowing is hardly
offset, resulting in a decrease in physical capital that is about twice as large as in
the baseline case.
If instead investment funds intermediate the credit that was previously held
by shadow banks (the ’fund dependent’ scenario), capital reduction is comparable
to the bank dependent scenario. The behavior is the result of different mech-
anisms, however. Shadow banks allow commercial banks to circumvent capital
requirements and raise more deposits than households would be willing to lend
to commercial banks themselves. In the case of large investment funds instead of
shadow banks, any losses are passed on to the households owning the fund shares.
New investments in investment funds still take place as households decrease con-
sumption and allocate their resources to savings, especially fund shares.
The behavior of shadow bank lending following a monetary policy tightening is
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Figure 4.3: Model IRFs to monetary policy tightening of 100 basis points. Note:
The horizontal axis reports quarters since the shock. The vertical axis reports
percentage deviations from the steady state (except for the interest rates and the
EFP, which are reported in percentage points).
consistent with the literature. A monetary tightening in the model induces a drop
in commercial bank lending. In the BVAR in Chapter 2, commercial bank lending
contracts in a hump shaped fashion over six years. The increase in investment
fund and shadow bank loans in the empirical results are mirrored in the model
reaction. A resulting negative 0.6% in GDP in the BVAR is exactly reached in the
model. The difference is in timing. While the model reacts within the first couple
of periods, the empirical IRFs have a longer transmission period. For the sake
of tractability, I refrain from using any modeling devices that replicate empirical
IRFs more closely.
Pescatori and Sole (2016), Nelson et al. (2015) and Igan et al. (2013) all show
empirically that some shadow banks increase lending after monetary policy tight-
ening, while commercial banks reduce lending. den Haan and Sterk (2011) show
that both mortgages and consumption credit by shadow banks increase following
an increase in the monetary policy rate. Finally, Altunbas et al. (2009) show that
European banks with more securitization activities reduce their lending by less
than non-securitizing banks after monetary tightening. European universal banks
house both commercial banking and shadow banking activities within the same
group structure. This finding is in line with understanding securitizing banks to
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be less affected by monetary shocks because their shadow banking operations are
larger, which insulates aggregate group lending behavior by increasing shadow
bank lending following monetary policy tightening.
4.4.3 Business cycle effects
The benchmark economy with shadow banks compares well to second moments of
some key variables in the data. Table 4.3 shows a close fit for GDP and interme-
diary credit standard deviations. Fixed capital is not as volatile as in the data,
which might be due to labor being fully flexible and absorbing volatility in the
production process. Model features like variable capital utilization and either mo-
nopolistically competitive labor unions or a search and matching process between
firms and workers might fix this.
Shadow bank loans held by
Variable Data Baseline Banks Split 50/50 Funds
GDP 1.26 1.45 1.21 1.25 1.33
Inflation .79 .56 .44 .44 .48
Consumption .73 1.09 .91 .92 .95
Physical capital 4.28 2.57 2.32 2.36 2.42
Commercial bank loans 5.76 5.51 6.65 6.60 7.11
Investment fund loans 7.44 7.28 15.46 8.39 5.16
Shadow bank loans 5.86 5.72 – – –
Table 4.3: Second moments of data and model variants (all numbers in %). Note:
Second moments for the data are calculated from cyclical variations around the
one-sided HP filtered log data from 1984:I to 2006:IV. Second moments for the
model variants are based on shock processes as estimated in Section 4.4.1.
If shadow banks are eliminated, the volatility of aggregate variables necessarily
decreases because the stochastic process affecting shadow bank equity is elimi-
nated. The three counterfactual scenarios can therefore be compared among each
other but not to the baseline scenario. GDP and consumption are more volatile in
fund-heavy economies because households earn a state-contingent return on fund
shares instead of a non-contingent return on commercial bank deposits. Although
this makes consumption smoothing more difficult, it insulates the financial sector
from assuming losses. Passing on variable profits may increase financial stability
by having the ultimate equity holders help absorb fundamental shocks.
Apart from a change in second moments, variable means may also change.20
20Deterministic steady states are studied, which ignore precautionary savings, to guarantee
comparability among model variants.
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Since the fundamentals in the economy are not affected by the composition of
the financial system, means of real variables are unchanged. Instead, funding of
the financial sector moves into the spotlight. In a more bank-dependent economy,
commercial banks have to increase their deposit base by about 25%. This benefits
households by increasing their total return from deposits by about 35%. Without
shadow banks, however, regulatory arbitrage is not possible and commercial banks
have to increase their equity holdings by about 80%. This increase in equity is
arguably better for the stability of the financial sector, but it does beg the question
whether commercial banks would be able to raise the required capital following a
financial crisis.
In the case that the economy becomes more fund-dependent, commercial bank
deposits diminish. Instead, fund share holdings are increased by about 40%, while
commercial bank equity stays the same. This increases total fund returns to
households, while decreasing total returns to deposits. The net result is a slightly
higher total return for households from financial assets compared to the baseline
case, and a 5 percentage point increase above the bank-dependent scenario. The
reason for this is that fund returns include a rent from the surplus of the funding
match (see Appendix C.1.3).
4.5 Shadow bank regulation at the zero lower
bound
Before the financial crisis, the shadow banking system contributed about 35% of
credit to the real economy. This share has dropped significantly since 2007 (see
Figure C.3 in Appendix C.3). The shadow banking system has been the explicit
focus of financial regulation in many countries around the world(see Financial
Stability Board, 2016). Although no consensus has emerged, the dominant princi-
ple has been to bring credit intermediation out of the shadows. This means that
shadow banks would either be differently regulated, or that they cease to exist
and that the credit demand they previously intermediated would be assumed by
other institutions. In effect, the options then are to regulate this credit demand
like commercial bank credit, like investment funds, or a combination of those. At
the same time, many of those same economies have been plagued by the ZLB
on nominal interest rates. Central banks and governments are actively trying to
escape the ZLB with different measures and varying success. This section studies
how an economy behaves under different financial intermediary regimes during a
prolonged time at the ZLB.
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4.5.1 Technical specifications
A ZLB on nominal interest rates means that the central bank cannot set the net
monetary policy rate below 0, which amounts to an occasionally binding con-
straint. Formally, this changes the Taylor rule, equation (4.37), to
it =
i
ρi
t−1
[
iSS(pit)
κpi
(
Yt
YSS
)κy]1−ρi
t , if it > 0
0 , otherwise.
(4.39)
Since this induces non-linearities in the policy functions of economic agents,
I use the method by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) to find an approximated
solution. The utilized OccBin toolbox considers an economy with two regimes, the
”reference” regime in which the monetary policy rate follows a linearized Taylor
rule and the ”alternative” regime in which it is constant at zero. A piecewise-
linear solution is found by considering the reference regime where the constraint
is slack until the monetary policy rate reaches its lower bound. The regime then
switches to the alternative where the constraint is binding until the reference
regime indicates a move away from the constraint. Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015)
show that the piecewise-linear solution from their toolbox is comparable to a global
solution for the ZLB case in the Smets and Wouters (2007) model. The Smets
and Wouters model is the baseline framework for the Gertler and Karadi set-up,
which I use here.
0 5 10 15 20 25-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Ne
t q
ua
rte
rly
 po
licy
 ra
te 
in 
%
 
 
Policy rate constrained by the ZLB
Unconstrained policy rate
Figure 4.4: Monetary policy path after negative demand shocks. Note: The
horizontal axis shows periods in quarters. The vertical axis is the net policy rate
in annualized percentage points.
A common way of analyzing the ZLB in theoretical models is to assume pref-
erence shocks21 that elicit households to forego consumption today, see also Chris-
21Although the financial crisis of 2008 has its roots in the financial sector, a negative household
demand shock captures the reaction to the destruction in household wealth that followed the
73
4.5. Shadow bank regulation at the zero lower bound
tiano et al. (2011) and Fernndez-Villaverde et al. (2015). Following this literature,
I turn monetary policy smoothing off (ρi = 0). In addition, I increase price rigidity
to γ = 0.9 and the Taylor rule coefficient for inflation to κpi = 2.5 as in Guerrieri
and Iacoviello (2015). These changes limit the use of disinflation in order to escape
the ZLB, which is in line with the current ZLB experience. Following the drop in
demand, output and inflation fall. This prompts the monetary authority to lower
the policy rate until it reaches zero.
The discount factor receives an innovation of β = 0.06, which decreases output
by 4 percent during a ZLB episode, comparable to the drop in GDP in 2008 (see
the cyclical variation in the GDP panel in 2009, Figure C.6 in Appendix C.3.3).
The monetary authority reacts by lowering the policy rate, see Figure 4.4. An
unconstrained policy stimulates investment by lowering borrowing costs, while also
limiting household incentives to save. With a ZLB, the economy never receives
this feedback and is instead stuck with a policy rate that is above its desired level.
Without the ZLB (black, dotted line), the quarterly policy rate initially drops
to −1.8% and remains negative for 8 quarters. Evaluating the quantitative fit
of the reaction of unconstrained monetary policy is difficult because the Federal
Open Market Committee (the monetary policy-making body of the Federal Re-
serve System) does not publish this data. Shadow rates as in Wu and Xia (2016);
Krippner (2014); Lombardi and Zhu (2014) estimate policy rates that include the
effects of other monetary accommodations and can act as a proxy. They are not
the same as the desired policy and report quarterly rates as low as −1.25%. This
falls short of my model estimate, which is plausible given that the monetary au-
thority in the unconstrained case achieves better stabilization (GDP drops by less
than 1%).
4.5.2 Implications of replacing credit supply of shadow
banks with credit supply of banks or funds
As explained in Section 4.4.2, bank credit decreases in response to monetary policy
tightening due to the bank lending channel. However, shadow banks and invest-
ment funds increase lending. This behavior suggests that a policy rate above its
natural level is conducive for NBFI lending. Furthermore, it begs the question
whether an economy with a larger share of aggregate credit coming from NBFI
drop in real estate values as well as the effects on household asset holdings in financial firms.
If real estate wealth or mortgages were explicitly modeled, I could include a shock that lowers
their value.
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Commercial banks Investment funds Shadow banks
i) Baseline case 40% 25% 35%
ii) Bank dependent case 75% 25% –
iii) Fund dependent case 40% 60% –
Table 4.4: Loan shares under different regulatory scenarios. Note: The baseline
case corresponds roughly to the shares of fixed income securities to the real sector
in 2006. The bank dependent case refers to credit previously held by shadow banks
to be intermediated by commercial banks. The fund dependent case assumes that
all shadow bank credit is lent out by investment funds.
may be less affected by a policy rate above its natural level. To answer this ques-
tion, I analyze the response of the economy under three different scenarios: i) the
baseline case with commercial banks, investment funds and shadow banks under
the baseline parameterization; ii) the bank dependent case in which shadow banks
are eliminated and the excess credit demand is taken up by commercial banks;
and iii) the fund dependent case in which investment funds take on all of the loans
previously intermediated by shadow banks. The baseline case is ’historical’ in the
sense that a large shadow banking system was intact prior to the crisis but has
decreased markedly since. Shadow banks are likely to be more heavily regulated
going forward. The last case assumes that several regulatory proposals that favor
the capital market based credit system over the bank based one are enacted. This
approach is currently being taken in Europe with the Capital Markets Union ex-
pected to allow NBFI to increase their market share. Table 4.4 summarizes the
loan shares for the three cases.
Figure 4.5 shows the evolution of key variables for the case in which the ZLB is
binding (left hand side) and in which the policy rate is unconstrained (right hand
side). Consider the baseline case with a shadow banking system intact (blue,
solid line) with an unconstrained monetary policy. An increase in the household
discount factor induces households to consume less and save more. To counter this
development, monetary policy is reduced, thereby lowering the real rate, which
stimulates investments. The additional credit is supplied by banks, which face
reduced financing costs via deposits. A deep recession can be avoided by quickly
lowering the policy rate.
Next, consider the baseline case under the ZLB (blue line in the left hand pan-
els). While the economy suffers from inadequate demand, the policy rate is bound
at zero. The real rate can therefore not fall enough to stimulate investment and in
fact rises, since the drop in demand results in deflation. This causes commercial
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banks to decrease lending, because their funding supply decreases. As a result,
only the most creditworthy firms (i.e., those with a high marginal return on cap-
ital) can keep borrowing. Although some credit is channeled via shadow banks,
and investment funds receive an inflow in funding because they pay a higher ex-
pected return than deposits, credit does not increase enough to counter the drop
in demand. A negative 4% drop in output follows, which is comparable to the re-
cession following the recent financial crisis. This scenario is no longer applicable,
since the financial crisis caused many shadow banks to go out of business, thereby
eliminating the opportunity for commercial banks to channel funds off their own
balance sheets.
Credit previously held by shadow banks is now taken on by commercial banks
or investment funds. The bank dependent case (green, dotted line) illustrates
this scenario. Since commercial banks’ supply of funds is decreasing, they are
reluctant to grant credit and they cut back on lending. Investment funds receive
an inflow in funding, as households earn more from fund shares than commercial
bank deposits. Since investment funds pass on the lower profits from depressed
borrowing rates, they still profit from additional lending and therefore increase
credit intermediation. Although additional investment fund lending counteracts
the reduction in commercial bank lending somewhat, it is not sufficient to generate
enough investment to stop the recession. The economy unconstrained by a ZLB
does not suffer such a sharp recession, as commercial banks do not scale back
lending as much due to the cheap refinancing via negative real rates. Following
the ZLB episode, commercial banks slowly reverse credit intermediation back to
steady state levels. At the same time, investment funds reduce lending as the
policy rate is back to its natural level.
Finally, consider the case in which investment funds provide the largest share
of credit (red, dashed line). Again commercial bank lending is reduced, following a
reduction in funding. However, lending by investment funds increases sufficiently
to motivate enough investments for a prolonged period. The reason for this is that
in steady state households are less invested in deposits and the rebalancing into
fund shares is less pronounced. This reduces the impact of the lending channel
and allows more firms to invest into capital. These investments keep GDP from
dropping as much as in the bank dependent scenario and allow for a less severe
recession compared to the bank dependent case.
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4.5.3 A demand shock at the ZLB initiates the bank
lending channel
The more favorable dynamics of a less bank-based credit system during a ZLB
episode can be explained via the bank lending channel of monetary policy. In
order to better understand this result, consider the Euler equation (4.4) with the
value of fund investments, Equation (4.5), inserted in the last term on the right
hand side:
%t = (1− ft)Etβt+1Rt+1%t+1 + ftEtβt+1
{
RIFt+1%t+1 + µt+1θIF ξ
IF
t+1
}
. (4.40)
The economic disturbance that hits the economy in this exploration is a large
demand shock that increases the household discount factor. Households reduce
current period consumption until the marginal utility of consumption rises to equal
the right hand side of the Euler condition. To limit incentives for households to
save, the monetary authority reduces the policy rate, lowering the real rate Rt+1
in an economy unconstrained by the ZLB. This has two effects: the marginal
utility of current consumption on the left hand side does not have to rise as much
so current consumption is not reduced as much. In addition, the lower real rate
results in additional investments. Consequently, aggregate demand only suffers
slightly.
If the economy is constrained by the ZLB, the policy rate cannot counter the
increase in the first term on the right hand side of the Euler condition. Current
period consumption has to drop further to satisfy a higher marginal utility of
consumption. The second component of aggregate demand, investment, does not
rise enough to counter this development, since the real interest rate remains above
the unconstrained level. Because of deflation, the real rate even rises. A much
more pronounced recession is the result.
The increase in the real rate is likewise the reason for the bank lending channel
becoming operational in the case of a demand shock at the ZLB. This can be seen
by taking the differences of the variable responses in case of the ZLB versus the
unconstrained paths, which removes the effects purely due to the demand shock.
Figure 4.6 shows these IRFs. The ‘shock’ in this diagram is due to the monetary
authority’s inability to lower the policy rate by an additional two percentage points
after the demand shock hits. The reactions of most other variables are then similar
to the case of monetary policy tightening in Section 4.4.2.
Now consider the second term in the right hand side of the Euler condition.
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Figure 4.6: Differences in reactions of the ZLB and unconstrained models to a
demand shock. Note: The horizontal axis reports quarters since the shock. The
vertical axis reports percentage deviations from the steady state (except for the
interest rates and the EFP, which are reported in percentage point deviations).
If households can easily find investment funds as an alternative to deposits, the
fund finding rate ft is higher and the weight on the first term on the right hand
side is smaller. The inability of the monetary authority to lower the policy rate
does not affect the economy as much. Instead, the focus shifts to the reaction of
variables in the second term, the fund rate RIFt+1 and the additional value from
being invested in fund shares µt+1. In a bank-dependent credit economy, both
variables increase strongly following the activation of the bank lending channel,
because funds are able to strongly raise the fund rate they pay on shares. In a
fund-dependent economy, there are already many funds in operation and many
households invested in them. Therefore funds have a reduced incentive to increase
the fund rate.22
The fund-based economy can be interpreted as one in which households have
already exhausted most options for higher yielding, non-depository assets. The
activation of the bank lending channel then has little effect on the funding supply
of the economy. Alternatively, in a bank based economy, households rebalance
their portfolios towards higher yielding assets, which increases the effectiveness of
22Additional households on the funding market are a positive externality for searching funds,
but seen as congestion from the perspective of searching households (Petrongolo and Pissarides,
2001).
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the bank lending channel. The reduction in credit is not desirable while the policy
rate is at the ZLB. This can be countered by lowering the effectiveness of the bank
lending channel through more non-depository sources of funding.
4.6 Conclusions
Shadow banking in the sense of regulatory arbitrage as treated here will likely
be strongly contained in the regulatory overhaul currently discussed in various
countries. Since the void will have to be filled with credit coming from different
sources, this paper suggests some business cycle implications for credit systems
that are more equity versus deposit based. If commercial banks pick up the credit
previously supplied by shadow banks, consumption volatility is reduced. If instead
investment funds are taking up the additional credit demand, consumption is more
volatile, resulting from the state-contingent return that fund investments deliver.
Allocating losses to the ultimate equity holders instead of concentrating them in
the financial sector may have additional benefits for financial stability that go
beyond the scope of this paper.
A key advantage of having a fund-dependent financial sector comes from the
behavior at the ZLB. Investment funds benefit from a higher real rate as they
experience a funding inflow from savers in contrast to commercial banks. This
inflow is translated into more loans that partially make up for the reduction in
commercial bank credit. The effectiveness of the bank lending channel is therefore
reduced, which is beneficial during a ZLB episode. Although a recession cannot
be avoided, the drop in GDP is not as deep, and the return to steady state levels
occurs more quickly when the credit economy is funded less by deposits and more
by fund shares.
The paper therefore supports current plans in the European Union to increase
the size of the market based financial system on the basis of an increased resilience
to ZLB issues. However, in order to make more comprehensive suggestions, a de-
tailed analysis based on European data and financial system configurations would
need to follow. The same argument that favors fund based credit systems during
ZLB episodes might speak in favor of a bank based system outside the ZLB. The
bank lending channel is more effective in a more deposit based credit system, i.e.,
credit will react more strongly to monetary policy. This may be desirable, if the
monetary authority wants to stave off a potential recession by lowering the pol-
icy rate and stimulating credit. Whether one credit system dominates the other
therefore depends on the frequency at which monetary policy is constrained by
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the ZLB.
There are several directions along which this analysis may be extended. This
includes modeling explicit regulatory tools, like leverage restrictions, liquidity re-
quirements or macroprudential instruments to allow for more nuanced policy rec-
ommendations. Also, the effectiveness of fiscal measures might vary depending
on the share of equity and deposit funding of the credit economy. On a related
note, unconventional monetary policy in the form of large scale asset purchases or
forward guidance is likely to have varying impacts on and interactions with the
different intermediaries, which changes their effectiveness depending on the credit
system configuration.
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A.1 Full BVARs
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Figure A.1: Responses of fixed income credit holdings by intermediaries to a
contractionary monetary policy shock. Note: This is the baseline specification.
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Figure A.2: Responses of bank credit price and volume.
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Figure A.3: Responses of fund credit price and volume.
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Figure A.4: Responses of bank funding.
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Figure A.5: Responses of investment fund shareholdings.
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A.2 Data Sources
Variables Description Source
Aggregate Output Yt Real Gross Domestic Product, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
M2 Money Supply M2SL, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
Inflation pit Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All
Items
Stock and Watson (2012)
Index of sentitive materials prices Stock and Watson (2012)
Federal Funds Rate ıt Effective Federal Funds Rate Stock and Watson (2012)
Bank Loans St Fixed income credit to the real sector
1 of U.S.-
chartered depository institutions and credit unions,
USD, not s.a.
U.S. FoF
Investment Fund Loans SFt Fixed income credit to the real sector of Money Mar-
ket Mutual Funds, Mutual Funds, USD, not s.a.
U.S. FoF
Shadow bank Loans SSt Fixed income credit to the real sector of ABS Issuers,
Financing Companies, Funding Corporations, Secu-
rity Brokers and Dealers, USD, not s.a.
U.S. FoF
Investment fund rate averages of total returns per share; equity of each fund CRSP Database
Price of bank credit Bank Prime Loan Rate, Percent, Monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted U.S. FoF
Bank funding Checkable deposits; small and large time and savings deposits U.S. FoF
Shareholdings in investment funds Household shareholdings in money market funds and mutual funds U.S. FoF
Table A.1: Data sources and definitions.
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B.1 Appendix: Full Model Equations
B.1.1 Original BGG
Resource constraint
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + C
e
t + µ
∫ ω¯t
0
ωdF (ω)RktQt−1Kt (B.1.1)
Consumption Euler relation
1
Ct
= βEt
Rt+1
Ct+1
(B.1.2)
Entrepreneurial consumption
Cet = (1− γ)Nt (B.1.3)
Supply of investment finance [BGG (4.5)]
EtRkt+1 = s
(
Nt+1
QtKt+1
)
Rt+1 (B.1.4)
Expected gross return to capital [BGG (4.4)]
EtRkt+1 = Et
{
1
Xt+1
αYt+1
Kt+1
+Qt+1(1− δ)
Qt
}
(B.1.5)
Price of capital [BGG (4.3)]
Qt =
[
Φ′
(
It
Kt
)]−1
(B.1.6)
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Production function [BGG (4.1)]
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t (B.1.7)
Labor market equilibrium [BGG (4.11) and BGG Appendix (B.4)]
(1− α)Ω Yt
Ht
1
Ct
= Xtξ
1
1−Ht (B.1.8)
Phillips curve
pit = Et−1{κ(−xt) + βpit+1} (B.1.9)
Evolution of capital [BGG (4.2)]
Kt+1 = Φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt + (1− δ)Kt (B.1.10)
Evolution of net worth [BGG (4.13)]
Nt+1 = γ
[
RktQt−1Kt −
(
Rt +
µ
∫ ω¯t
0
ωdF (ω)RktQt−1Kt
Qt−1Kt −Nt
)
(Qt−1Kt −Nt)
]
+W et
(B.1.11)
Entrepreneurial wage [BGG (4.12)] and Het normalized to 1
(1− α)(1− Ω)Yt/Het = XtW et (B.1.12)
Gross nominal interest rate [BGG appendix]
1 + it+1 = Rt+1pit+1 (B.1.13)
Deposits at intermediaries [BGG appendix and BGG (3.2)]
Dt+1 = Bt+1 = QtKt+1 −Nt+1 (B.1.14)
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B.1.2 Firm entry extension
Equation (B.1.11) is replaced by Equation (E.4):
Nt+1 = γ
[
RktQt−1Kt −
(
Rt +
µ
∫ ω¯t
0
ωdF (ω)RktQt−1Kt
Qt−1Kt −Nt
)
(Qt−1Kt −Nt)
]
+ftDt+1.
(B.1.15)
Probability that a household will find an investment
ft = s
(
vt
Dt+1
)1−η
(B.1.16)
Effective deposits that have not been invested in equity
Det+1 = (1− ft)Dt+1 (B.1.17)
Available deposits at intermediaries, Equation (B.1.14) , becomes
Det+1 = Bt+1 = QtKt+1 −Nt+1 (B.1.18)
The consumption Euler Equation (B.1.2) is replaced by Equation (E.5) with
marginal utility of consumption %t = 1/Ct
1
Ct
= (1− ft)βEtRt+1
Ct+1
+ ft(µt +
1
Ct
) (B.1.19)
Marginal additional utility of entrepreneurial equity over deposits
µt +
1
Ct
= βEt
{
RNt+1
Ct+1
+ γµt+1Rt+1
}
(B.1.20)
Probability that a potential entrepreneur will find funding
qt = s
(
vt
Dt+1
)−η
(B.1.21)
Euler condition for project pitches with Λt,t+1 = %t+1/%t
κ
qt
= βEtΛt,t+1
{
K
N
Rkt+1 −
B
N
Rt+1 −RNt+1 + γ
κ
qt+1
}
(B.1.22)
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Dividend payments
RNt = Rt + λ
[
K
N
(Rkt −Rt) + κ
ft
qt
]
(B.1.23)
Market clearing, Equation (B.1.1) is modified to
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + µ
∫ ω¯t
0
ωdF (ω)RktQt−1Kt + κvt (B.1.24)
B.2 Log-Linearized: Original BGG
Resource constraint
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
it +
G
Y
gt +
Ce
Y
cet + ...+ φ
y
t (B.2.1)
Consumption Euler relation
ct = −rt+1 + Etct+1 (B.2.2)
Entrepreneurial consumption
cet = nt+1 + ...+ φ
ce
t (B.2.3)
Supply of investment finance [BGG (4.5)]
Etrkt+1 − rt+1 = ν[nt+1 − (qt + kt+1)] (B.2.4)
Expected gross return to capital [BGG (4.4)]
rkt+1 = (1− )(yt+1 − kt+1 − xt+1) + qt+1 − qt (B.2.5)
Price of capital [BGG (4.3)]
qt = ϕ(it − kt) (B.2.6)
Production function [BGG (4.1)]
yt = at + αkt + (1− α)Ωht (B.2.7)
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Labor market equilibrium [BGG (4.11) and BGG Appendix (B.4)]
yt − ht − xt − ct = η−1ht (B.2.8)
Phillips curve
pit = Et−1{κ(−xt) + βpit+1} (B.2.9)
Evolution of capital [BGG (4.2)]
kt+1 = δit + (1− δ)kt (B.2.10)
Evolution of net worth [BGG (4.13)]
nt+1 =
γRK
N
(rkt − rt) + rt + nt + ...+ φnt (B.2.11)
B.2.1 Log-Linearized: Firm entry extension
Equation (B.2.11) becomes
nt+1 =
γRK
N
(rkt − rt) + rt + nt +
fSSDSS
N
(fˆt + dt+1)...+ φ
n
t (B.2.12)
Probability that a household will find an investment
fˆt = (1− η)(vˆt − Dˆt) (B.2.13)
Effective deposits that have not been invested in equity
Dˆet+1 =
fSS
1− fSS fˆt + Dˆt+1 (B.2.14)
Available deposits at intermediaries, Equation (B.1.14) , becomes
Dˆet+1 =
K
DeSS
(qt + kt+1)− N
DeSS
nt+1 (B.2.15)
The consumption Euler Equation (B.2.2) is replaced by (with %ˆt = −ct)
%ˆt = βR[(1− fSS)(rt+1 + %ˆt+1)− fSS fˆt]fSS(%ˆt + fˆt) + fSS µSS
%SS
(µˆt + fˆt) (B.2.16)
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Marginal additional utility of entrepreneurial equity over deposits
%ˆt +
µSS
%SS
= βRNSS(r
N
t+1 + %ˆt+1) + γR
µSS
%SS
(µˆt+1 + rt+1) (B.2.17)
Probability that a potential entrepreneur will find funding
qˆt = η(Dˆt+1 − vˆt) (B.2.18)
Euler condition for project pitches
− qˆt = ct − ct+1 + 1∗
[
K
N
Rkrkt+1 −
B
N
Rrt+1 −RNrNt+1 − γ
κ
qSS
qˆt+1
]
(B.2.19)
Dividend payments
RNrNt = Rrt + λ
[
K
N
(Rkrkt −Rrt)− γ
fSS
qSS
(fˆt − qˆt)
]
(B.2.20)
Market clearing, Equation (B.2.1) is modified to
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
it +
G
Y
gt +
Ce
Y
cet +
vSS
Y
vˆt + ...+ φ
y
t (B.2.21)
B.3 Steady State: BGG
Resource constraint
Y = C + I +G+ Ce + µ
∫ ω¯t
0
ωdF (ω)RkK (B.3.1)
Consumption Euler relation
R = 1/β (B.3.2)
Entrepreneurial consumption
Ce = (1− γ)N (B.3.3)
Supply of investment finance [BGG (4.5)]
Rk = s
(
N
K
)
R (B.3.4)
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Expected gross return to capital [BGG (4.4)]
Rk =
{
1
X
αY
K
+ (1− δ)
}
(B.3.5)
Price of capital [BGG (4.3)]
1 = Q =
[
Φ′
(
I
K
)]−1
(B.3.6)
Production function [BGG (4.1)]
Y = KαL1−α (B.3.7)
Labor market equilibrium [BGG (4.11) and BGG Appendix (B.4)]
(1− α)ΩY
H
1
C
= Xξ
1
1−H (B.3.8)
Phillips curve
pit = Et−1{κ(−xt) + βpit+1} (B.3.9)
Evolution of capital [BGG (4.2)]
K = Φ
(
I
K
)
K + (1− δ)K (B.3.10)
Evolution of net worth [BGG (4.13)]
N = γ
[
RkK −
(
R +
µ
∫ ω¯t
0
ωdF (ω)RkK
K −N
)
(K −N)
]
+W e (B.3.11)
Entrepreneurial wage [BGG (4.12)] and He normalized to 1
(1− α)(1− Ω)Y = XW e (B.3.12)
Gross nominal interest rate [BGG appendix]
1 + i = R (B.3.13)
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Deposits at intermediaries [BGG appendix and BGG (3.2)]
D = B = K −N (B.3.14)
B.4 Data Sources
Parameter Description Source Data Series
K/N 1945 - 2014 U.S. Flows of Funds Z1/Z1/FL102000005.A; Z1/OTHER/FL105080003.A
Rk −R 1959 - 2003 St. Louis FRED DTB6; WPRIME
Table B.1: Data sources and definitions
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
C.1 Model Derivation
C.1.1 Solution to the Commercial Bank’s Problem
Substituting Dt in Equation (4.7) from Equation (4.6), the ongoing value of a
commercial bank Equation (4.8) can be expressed recursively as
V CBt = ν
CB
t QtS
CB
t + ν
MCB
t M
CB
t + η
CB
t N
CB
t (C.1.1)
with the marginal benefit from extending loans νCBt given by
νCBt = Et{(1− θCB)βt+1Λt,t+1(RKt+1 −Rt+1) + βt+1Λt,t+1θCBxCBt+1νCBt+1}, (C.1.2)
where xCBt+1 is the gross growth rate of assets Qt+1S
CB
t+1/QtS
CB
t . Similarly, the
marginal benefit from extending commercial paper νMCBt given by
νMCBt = Et{(1− θCB)βt+1Λt,t+1(RMt+1 −Rt+1) + βt+1Λt,t+1θCBxMCBt+1 νMCBt+1 },
(C.1.3)
where xMCBt+1 is the gross growth rate of commercial paper M
CB
t+1/M
CB
t . The
marginal benefit from extending net worth ηCBt is
ηCBt = Et{(1− θCB)βt+1Λt,t+1Rt+1 + βt+1Λt,t+1θCBzCBt+1ηCBt+1, (C.1.4)
and the gross growth rate of net worth zCBt+1 = N
CB
t /N
CB
t−1 .
Together with the incentive constraint in Equation (4.9), the Lagrangian can
be written
L = V CBt + µCBt [V CBt − λCB(QtSCBt + [1− λABS]MCBt )]
= (1 + µCBt )(ν
CB
t QtS
CB
t + ν
MCB
t M
CB
t + η
CB
t N
CB
t )− µCBt λCB(QtSCBt + [1− λABS]MCBt ).
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The first order conditions with respect to SCBt , M
CB
t and µ
CB
t are, respectively,
(1 + µCBt )ν
CB
t = µ
CB
t λ
CB (C.1.5)
(1 + µCBt )ν
MCB
t = µ
CB
t λ
CB[1− λABS] (C.1.6)
QtS
CB
t (ν
CB
t − λCB) +MCBt (νMCBt − λCB[1− λABS]) + ηCBt NCBt = 0. (C.1.7)
Equations (C.1.5) and (C.1.6) result in νMCBt = ν
CB
t [1− λABS], which can be
substituted into Equation (C.1.7) to yield
QtS
CB
t +M
CB
t (1− λABS) = NCBt φCBt , (C.1.8)
with the endogenous leverage variable given by
φCBt =
ηCBt
λCB − νCBt
. (C.1.9)
C.1.2 Solution to the Shadow Bank’s Problem
Substituting MCBt in Equation (4.20) from Equation (4.18), the ongoing value of
a shadow bank Equation (4.19) can be expressed recursively as
V SBt = ν
SS
t QtS
SB
t − νMFt M IFt + ηSBt NSBt (C.1.10)
with the marginal benefit from extending loans νSBt given by
νSSt = Et{(1− θSB)βt+1Λt,t+1(RKt+1 −RMCBt+1 ) + βt+1Λt,t+1θSBxSSt+1νSSt+1}, (C.1.11)
where xSSt+1 is the gross growth rate of assets Qt+1S
SB
t+1/QtS
SB
t . Similarly, the
marginal benefit from increasing funding by commercial paper held by investment
funds is νMFt given by
νMFt = Et{(1−θSB)βt+1Λt,t+1(RMIFt+1 −RMCBt+1 )+βt+1Λt,t+1θSBxMFt+1 νMFt+1 }, (C.1.12)
where xMFt+1 is the gross growth rate of commercial paper M
IF
t+1/M
IF
t . The marginal
benefit from extending net worth ηSBt is
ηSBt = Et{(1− θSB)βt+1Λt,t+1RMCBt+1 + βt+1Λt,t+1θSBzSBt+1ηSBt+1, (C.1.13)
and the gross growth rate of net worth zSBt+1 = N
SB
t+1/N
SB
t .
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Together with the incentive constraint in Equation (4.21), the Lagrangian can
be written
L = V SBt + µSBt [V SBt − ψCB(M IFt + [1− λABS]MCBt )]
= (1 + µSBt )(ν
SS
t QtS
SB
t − νMFt MSBt + ηSBt NSBt )− µSBt ψCB(QtSSBt [1− λABS] + λABSM IFt ).
The first order conditions with respect to SSBt , M
IF
t and µ
SB
t are, respectively,
(1 + µSBt )ν
SS
t = µ
SB
t ψ
CB(1− λABS) (C.1.14)
(1 + µSBt )ν
MF
t + µ
SB
t ψ
CBλABS = 0 (C.1.15)
QtS
SB
t (ν
SS
t − ψCB[1− λABS])−M IFt (νMFt + ψCBλABS) +NSBt (ηSBt + ψCB[1− λABS] = 0.
(C.1.16)
Equations (C.1.14) and (C.1.15) result in νMFt = −νSSt λ
ABS
1−λABS , which can be
substituted into Equation (C.1.16) to yield
QtS
SB
t = N
SB
t
ηSBt + ψ
CB(1− λABS)
ψCB(1− λABS)− νSS −M
IF
t
λABS
1− λABS . (C.1.17)
C.1.3 Interest Rate Bargaining
Households and investment funds share the joint value they derive from having
established a match via Nash bargaining according to the household bargaining
power ζHH . Interest rates are negotiated that maximize a convex combination of
the surpluses,
RIFt = argmax ζ
HH lnV HHt + (1− ζHH)lnV IFt .
The household value V HHt is made up of the value of owning a fund share V
HH,e
versus saving deposits at a commercial bank V HH,u:
V HH,et = R
IF
t + Etβt+1Λt,t+1[θIFV
HH,e
t+1 + (1− θIF )V HH,ut+1 ]
V HH,ut = Rt + Etβt+1Λt,t+1[ftV
HH,e
t+1 + (1− ft)V HH,ut+1 ].
Together they make up the household value
V HHt = R
IF
t −Rt + Etβt+1Λt,t+1(θIF − ft)V HHt+1 . (C.1.18)
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From the first-order condition for interest rate bargaining I know that
ζHH
V HHt
=
(1− ζHH)
V IFt
.
Solving this forward one period and substituting into Equation (C.1.18), as
well as inserting Etβt+Λt,t+1V IFt+1 = κ/qt from Equation (4.14), I get for the return
investment funds have to pay on their shares
RIFt = Rt + ζ
HH
{
ψIFRMIFt + (1− ψIF )RKt −Rt + κ
ft
qt
}
.
Note that investment funds can get away with paying only the risk-free deposit rate
in case that they have all the bargaining power. The interest rate on investment
shares rises with the bargaining power of households, guaranteeing at least the
risk-free rate.
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C.2 Robustness of matching elasticity ξ
The parameter for matching elasticity ξ is important for the dynamics of the
matching friction. The value is determined by the Bayesian estimation as 0.74
with relatively narrow posterior density intervals. However, there is no a priori
reason why the value could not be lower. In order to test whether the results
depend on the value of the matching elasticity, Figure C.1 shows the response of
the economy to the same monetary tightening as in Section 4.4.2 for the different
configurations of the financial sector but a matching elasticity of ξ = 0.2. In this
case, household savings play a larger part in establishing new matches.
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Figure C.1: IRFs to a monetary tightening of 100bp and the matching elasticity
ξ = .2.
The baseline scenario (blue, solid line) is almost unchanged, because invest-
ment funds only make up 25% of the credit economy. However, in the bank
dependent scenario (green, dotted line), investment funds increase their interme-
diation by more than with a lower elasticity. This is so because households can
more quickly substitute out of deposits and into higher yielding assets. In the fund
dependent case, investment fund lending increases more persistently than with a
higher elasticity.
In order to study the ZLB case, taking the differences of the responses to a
demand shock for constrained and unconstrained monetary policy as in Section
4.5.3 leads to the reactions in Figure C.2. The baseline case is not changed much,
and the bank dependent case is qualitatively similar to a higher elasticity. How-
101
C.2. Robustness of matching elasticity ξ
ever, the fund dependent case without shadow banks now shows a reaction that
is as favorable as the baseline case with shadow banks.
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Figure C.2: Difference of IRFs to demand shocks under the ZLB and unconstrained
monetary policy. Matching elasticity ξ = .2.
The robustness analysis shows that the results in the main body of the text
can be taken as a lower bound for the reaction of the fund dependent case, while
there is not a lot of variation in the baseline and bank dependent cases. The
Bayesian estimation provides a narrow standard deviation for the posterior of the
matching elasticity. However a quantitative study (e.g., in the case of a welfare
analysis) would benefit from further evidence for the exact matching parameter,
as the results may change.
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C.3 Empirical Resources
C.3.1 Data Sources
Variables Description Source
Aggregate Output Yt Real Gross Domestic Product, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
Consumption Ct Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services
and Nondurable Goods, USD, not s.a.
Stock and Watson (2012)
Physical Capital Kt Real Private Fixed Investment, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
M2 Money Supply M2SL, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
Total Reserves TOTRES, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
Non-borrowed Reserves NBRES, USD, not s.a. Stock and Watson (2012)
Inflation pit Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All
Items
Stock and Watson (2012)
Index of sentitive materials prices Stock and Watson (2012)
Federal Funds Rate it Effective Federal Funds Rate Stock and Watson (2012)
Commercial Bank Loans SCBt Fixed income credit to the real sector of U.S.-
chartered depository institutions and credit unions,
USD, not s.a.
Financial accounts of the United States
Investment Fund Loans SIFt Fixed income credit to the real sector of Money mar-
ket funds, Mutual Funds, USD, not s.a.
Financial accounts of the United States
Shadow bank Loans SSBt Fixed income credit to the real sector of ABS Issuers,
Finance Companies, Funding Corporations, Security
Brokers and Dealers, USD, not s.a.
Financial accounts of the United States
Table C.1: Data sources and definitions. Note: Fixed income credit to the real
sector are loans, bonds, consumer credit and commercial paper.
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Figure C.3: Timeline of credit intermediation share by the various components of
the US financial system, 1980 to 2014. Note: The red line titled ’LEH’ indicates
September 15, 2008. Source: Financial accounts of the United States.
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C.3.2 Full Bayesian VAR
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
G
D
P
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.5
0
0.5
C
P
I
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-10
-5
0
5
C
o m
m
o d
i t y
p r
i c
e  
i n
d e
x
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-1
0
1
F F
R
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-4
-2
0
M
2  
M
o n
e y
S
t o
c k
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0
5
10
T o
t a
l  r
e s
e r
v e
s
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0
5
10
N
o n
- b
o r
r o
w
e d
r e
s e
r v
e s
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-5
0
5
C
o m
m
e r
c i
a l
 
b a
n k
 l e
n d
i n
g
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-5
0
5
I n
v e
s t
m
e n
t  
f u
n d
 l e
n d
i n
g
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-5
0
5
S
h a
d o
w
b a
n k
 l e
n d
i n
g
Figure C.4: Response of all variables to a contractionary monetary policy shock.
Note: Empirical impulse responses of all variables to an unanticipated 100 ba-
sis point increase in the effective federal funds rate. The horizontal axis reports
quarters since the shock. The vertical axis reports percentage deviations from the
unshocked path. Shaded regions are 32nd-68th and 10th-90th percentiles of 1000
draws. Source: Mazelis (2016).
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C.3.3 Bayesian Estimation
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Figure C.5: Posteriors for the standard deviations and persistence of shock pro-
cesses, and structural parameters. Note: Bayesian estimation with data from
1984:I to 2006:IV. Posteriors are based on 2 chains of 100.000 draws each. I drop
the first 50.000 values of each chain.
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Figure C.6: Data: For each variable, the left panel shows unfiltered data (blue) and the trend component (blue), which is calculated via the one-sided HP filter. The right panel
shows the cyclical component (green). Note: Vertical axes are percentage points divided by 100 for cyclical variations and in logs for raw data and trend components.
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